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INNOVATIONS IN GOVERNANCE: A 
FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF PRIVATE 
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS 
TRACEY M. ROBERTS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Biodiversity loss, fishery collapse, deforestation, climate change, 
conflicts over natural resources, economic migration, and increasing 
inequality threaten economic and social stability throughout the 
world. These negative externalities have accompanied the economic 
gains that globalization has brought to many countries. Recent 
advances in communications technology have allowed communities to 
overcome geographic limits and act collectively to address those 
impacts. Communities are meeting their demand for governance not 
only through formal government and legislative and regulatory 
processes, but also through direct negotiations with other interested 
parties. Increasingly, groups are turning to private governance, rather 
than formal government, to address their needs. 
Private governance institutions provide governance without 
government. They are rules and structures by which individuals, 
communities, firms, civic organizations, and other entities govern 
their interests without the direct involvement of the state or its 
subsidiaries. Private governance institutions are limitless in their 
variety. Political science, sociology, law, and economics literature 
describes hundreds of variations of private governance institutions 
throughout the world that have developed their own community-
based rules for resource management and conflict resolution.1 This 
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 1.  See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE 
AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 8–9 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 
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article will only examine a few that have been developed in the last 
two decades or adapted in recent years to address significant social 
costs and environmental externalities arising from globalized trade: 
education and mobilization initiatives, firm contractual arrangements, 
corporate social responsibility programs, socially responsible 
investment, codes of conduct, environmental management systems, 
disclosure and reporting initiatives, learning initiatives, models and 
meta-standards, cooperatives, and voluntary standards, certification, 
and labeling mechanisms.2 
This article advances the private governance literature in three 
ways. First, the article outlines the descriptive and analytical 
shortcomings of existing taxonomies used to classify private 
governance institutions. Second, the article examines public demand 
for governance and the ways private governance institutions meet 
that demand.3 The article argues that private governance institutions 
arise in response to government failure at one or more stages of the 
regulatory process. This government failure may result, for example, 
from collective action problems, public choice dilemmas, rent-seeking 
 
2008); see also Indiana University’s Digital Library of the Commons, available at 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/ (compiling the existing literature on common-pool resources, 
including governance issues). 
 2.  While this article may have implications for formal government, it does not specifically 
examine or address the variety of hybrid forms or other “new governance” systems that have 
recently been initiated and developed by formal government, such as public voluntary programs 
and negotiated agreements. New governance diverges from traditional command-and-control 
forms of governmental regulation to include experimental programs, framework agreements, 
stakeholder developed rules, revisable standards, benchmarks for improvement, and public and 
peer participation mechanisms to ensure accountability. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. 
Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 
13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 541–42 (2007). While many of the new governance processes and 
forms may be similar to those we see in private governance institutions, formal government 
generally provides the framework for their initiation, development, and support in most studies 
of these systems. See id.; Gainne de Burca, New Governance and Experimentalism: An 
Introduction, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 227, 228 (2010). But see Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, 
Preemptive Self-regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 591 (2010) (diverging from the common usage to identify “new governance” 
as an approach, regulatory strategy, or tool for both public and private contexts which “blurs the 
boundaries between state-centered and self-regulatory, public and private” distinctions). 
 3.  Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 43, 43 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009) 
(suggesting that, from an economic point of view, demand for governance may arise from 
consumers seeking products or services from companies that have a record of fair treatment of 
their workers, fair payment to their agricultural suppliers, or environmentally sound 
operations); Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change 
in Global Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 1, 29, 33 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire 
Woods eds., 2009). 
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behavior, regulatory capture risks, and the challenge of funding 
public goods. The article also identifies the institutions’ innovative 
responses to market failures, including transaction costs, information 
asymmetries, agency problems, moral hazard, anti-competitive 
behavior, and externalities, all of which create the need for regulation 
in the first place. 
Finally, the article identifies a number of insights that a 
functional typology of private governance institutions yields. First, a 
functional typology clarifies the strengths of each type of private 
governance institution, thereby revealing key structures needed at 
each stage of the regulatory process, and suggesting improvements for 
both private governance and formal government. Second, the 
functional typology suggests that effective governance does not 
require that a single institution substitute for formal government at all 
stages of the regulatory process. Private governance institutions may 
complement formal government at key junctures, or they may 
coordinate and collaborate with each other to create network or 
ensemble regimes with the capacity to substitute formal government 
entirely. In fact, collaboration may be preferred, based on the 
complexities of the social and ecological systems that private 
governance and formal government are attempting to manage, as well 
as considerations associated with the theory of the firm. On the other 
hand, private governance institutions may compete with formal 
government through preemption and other crowding-out effects. 
Private governance institutions may also compete with one another 
through free-riding, dilution, and confusion. Sorting the institutions 
by function clarifies what each institution brings to the regulatory 
process, what each institution lacks, and how the institution may be 
supported or improved. 
The sorting process also underscores the importance of funding 
mechanisms in an institution’s overall effectiveness as a regulator. 
Efforts to analyze private governance institutions alongside 
institutions in which government plays a significant role, such as 
negotiated agreements, public voluntary programs, and other forms 
of new governance,4 have obscured the roles that funding mechanisms 
play in private governance because these functions are supplied 
largely by the tax system and the budgetary process in formal 
government contexts. Finally, the analysis identifies one type of 
private governance institution that currently attempts to substitute for 
 
 4.  See supra note 2. 
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government at all stages of the regulatory process: voluntary 
standards, certification, and labeling systems. 
The article is organized as follows. Part I describes existing 
taxonomies and their shortcomings. Part II describes the 
circumstances that give rise to a demand for private governance at 
each stage of the regulatory process and the barriers and hazards that 
block effective regulation by formal government at each stage. Part II 
also organizes private governance institutions according to the 
functions they serve in overcoming these barriers and hazards. The 
article then identifies the key characteristics or structures needed at 
each stage of the regulatory process to ensure effectiveness. Part III 
describes how certain private governance institutions also compete 
with formal government and other private governance institutions for 
regulatory space. 
I.  THE DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL LIMITS OF THE EXISTING 
TAXONOMIES 
Identifying what makes private governance institutions reliable, 
effective regulators is a meaningful exercise for a number of reasons. 
Parties that generate negative externalities5 may use private 
governance to avoid formal regulation. Private governance 
institutions not only complement formal government as well as other 
private governance institutions in order to meet demands for 
governance, they can also preempt formal regulation and compete 
with one another for participants, consumers, investors, and 
regulatory space.6 Consequences include “greenwashing”7 or 
 
 5.  As long as the total benefits to society from the activity outweigh the total harms 
caused by the activity, society enjoys a net gain in welfare. However, the individuals who enjoy 
the benefits of an activity or transaction may not be the only parties who bear the costs of that 
activity or transaction. When the costs associated with an activity or transaction are borne by 
third parties or by society at large, these costs are said to have been “externalized” and the harm 
is regarded as an “externality.” NATHANIEL O. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 66 (2007) (“An externality results when the actions of one individual 
(or firm) have a direct, unintentional, and uncompensated effect on the well-being of other 
individuals or the profits of other firms.”). 
 6.  These activities are described in more detail in Part III, infra. 
 7.  Greenwashing is a term used to describe the concealment of an organization’s 
environmental harms while advertising that the organization is acting to protect the 
environment. See Andrew Hoffman & Stephanie Bertels, Who Is Part of the Environmental 
Movement?,  in  GOOD COP, BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND THEIR STRATEGIES 
TOWARD BUSINESS 48, 62 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010)  (“[G]reenwashing [is] a term that 
implies presenting misleading information to conceal an organization’s abuse of the 
environment and present a positive public image.”). The term appears to have come into use 
with accusations that firms were “whitewashing” their “green” credentials or performance. 
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misinformation and fraud in meeting consumers’ and investors’ social 
and environmental preferences.8 
Previously, scholars have attempted to classify the diverse array 
of private governance institutions by their dominant stakeholder 
constituencies, based on whether those groups are primarily (1) firms 
and business groups, (2) nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
civic participants or community actors, (3) a hybrid of business groups 
and NGOs or civic participants, (4) formal government partnering 
with business, non-governmental, or civic participants, or (5) a 
combination of all these constituents.9 
Using this sectoral approach, scholars criticize certain 
institutions, suggesting that they will fail to serve the public interest 
because the stakeholders are not drawn broadly from all sectors.10 
This strategy draws on a normative or prescriptive form of 
stakeholder theory where more equitable outcomes are achieved by 
including all parties with a stake in those outcomes.11 Other scholars 
suggest that the regulatory regime will fail because stakeholder 
groups lack all of the required institutional competencies to function 
properly.12 Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal refine the stakeholder 
analysis, arguing that for private governance institutions to regulate in 
the public interest, the stakeholders must (1) address all stages of the 
regulatory process, and (2) collectively possess certain competencies 
to address the various stages of regulation such as independence, 
representativeness, expertise, and operational capacity.13 Abbott and 
Snidal explain that because businesses, NGOs, and government have 
 
 8.  Eric L. Lane, Consumer Protection in the Eco-Mark Era: A Preliminary Survey and 
Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-Mark Enforcement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INT’L PROP. L. 742 (2010). 
 9.  Graeme Auld et al., The New Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ANN. REV. ENV’T & 
RESOURCES 413 (2008); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance 
Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the Law, in THE POLITICS OF 
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 46–57 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009); Maria Carmen 
Lemos & Arun Agrawal, Environmental Governance and Political Science, in GOVERNANCE 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 69, 77–80 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009); Magali A. 
Delmas & Oran R. Young, Introduction to GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 3, 8 (Magali 
A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009). 
 10.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 64. 
 11.  R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY 170 (2010) (identifying the 
use of stakeholder theory by scholars as a normative and prescriptive goal to permit indigenous 
populations to have their interests taken into account by corporate decision-makers, and as an 
ideal method for reaching solutions that accommodate environmental equity, economic 
development, and broader environmental objectives). 
 12.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 46. 
 13.  Id. at 46, 64. 
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different competencies, “it is difficult, if not impossible” for private 
governance institutions to have all of the necessary competencies to 
contribute to all stages of the regulatory process.14 They conclude that 
the institutions most likely to provide regulation in the public interest 
are those that have stakeholder participation from each sector.15 
First, as a descriptive matter, institutions and their constituents 
do not always fit neatly into the business, civic, or government 
categories. There are frequently degrees of involvement of all three 
interests in each type of private governance institution.16 Second, 
private governance institutions may appear to be the same in terms of 
stakeholder composition and competencies, but have different rules 
and function in very different ways.17 Similar institutional structures 
may be used by business or by purely civic institutions.18 Furthermore, 
 
 14.  Id. at 46. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Abbott and Snidal develop a map that identifies the location of specific organizations 
within a “Governance Triangle” based on the extent to which states, firms, and NGOs 
participate directly in the management and operation of a particular organization or regulatory 
regime, recognizing the diversity in institutional forms and variation in sector control. See id. at 
46–57. 
 17.  See generally Benjamin Cashore et al., Legitimizing Political Consumerism: The Case 
of Forest Certification in North America and Europe, in POLITICS, PRODUCTS, AND MARKETS 
181 (Michele Micheletti et al. eds., 2003). For example, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an 
organization developed by environmental organizations, timber traders, indigenous groups, 
forest laborer organizations, and other stakeholders in 1993, created a certification and labeling 
system for forest products and their retailers to encourage sustainable management of forests 
globally. Graeme Auld et al., Certification Schemes and the Impacts on Forests and Forestry, 33 
ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 187, 189–90 (2008). The Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI), 
created by the American Forest and Paper Association, an industry trade association, developed 
a certification and labeling scheme for forestry products to compete with the system created by 
FSC. Id. at 191. SFI’s standards are process-oriented rather than prescriptive, and consequently, 
less stringent than those of FSC. Id. at 192. Initially, the public could differentiate the standards 
of the two organizations based on the identity of their participants. FSC was a nonprofit 
organization and SFI was business firm, a subsidiary of the American Forest and Paper 
Association. SFI was later converted into a tax-exempt nonprofit organization with tripartite 
governance that includes environmental organizations and government members as well as 
business and industrial interests. SFI now bears the same indicia of civic representation and the 
organizational structure reflects the same capacity for “representativeness” as FSC; however, 
the actual standards behind the two organizations remain significantly different. Here, despite 
an appearance of “representativeness,” the composition of the institution is not an accurate 
signal as to whether the institution is undertaking voluntary regulation that will have an overall 
beneficial effect on the greater community. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 76, 78. In such 
cases, the public cannot discern whether an institution is meeting their demand for regulation by 
looking at the relative participation by NGOs, business, and government in the governing 
structure. 
 18.  Some socially responsible investors, such as Domini Social Investments and Pax 
World, are for-profit organizations, which were developed to provide a return to their investors 
on a portfolio of investments that meet certain environmental and social criteria. Others, such as 
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while the rules that private governance institution constituents 
develop may be evenhanded initially, these rules may change over 
time to favor the interests of one group over another.19 In addition, 
private governance institutions may fall prey to internal conflicts of 
interest that belie their organizational status.20 Third, formal 
organization may not reflect underlying control of the private 
governance institution. Parties from each sector may be involved 
directly or indirectly, making it difficult to discern which sector is 
actually in control.21 For some private governance structures, 
government plays a significant role even though it is not a direct 
stakeholder or participant in the development of the institution. 
Governments interact with private firms in a variety of ways to 
coordinate regulatory activity.22 Legislators may consult with firms 
during the legislative process. Government agencies may consult with 
private firms when they develop regulations pursuant to legislative 
authority,23 and agencies may delegate certain aspects of regulatory 
 
the Acumen Fund are nonprofit organizations that provide no monetary return on investment 
to investors, but devote 100% of their net profits to further their social causes. Compare 
Sustainable & Responsible Investing, CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com/sri.html 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011), DOMINI SOCIAL INVESTMENTS, http://www.domini.com (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2011), and PAX WORLD, http://www.paxworld.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2011), with About 
Us, ACUMEN FUND, http://www.acumenfund.org/about-us.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  For example, the Nature Conservancy has had organizational structures in place to 
avoid conflicts of interest for many years, including specific written policies and a broad-based 
board of directors; it nevertheless became entangled in scandals associated with rent-seeking by 
its members and trustees in 2003. In 2003 the Washington Post disclosed that the organization 
had engaged in a number of questionable transactions with the organization’s trustees and 
board members and had begun resource extraction activities on one of its nature preserves. See 
Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Charity’s Land Deals to Be Scrutinized; Senators Send Letter 
to Nature Conservancy, WASH. POST, May 10, 2003, at A2. The organization was required to 
submit to an audit by the Internal Revenue Service and they received Congressional requests to 
attend public hearings. Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, IRS Toughens Scrutiny of Land 
Gifts, WASH. POST, July 1, 2004, at A1; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nature Conservancy 
Faces Panel Review, WASH. POST, July 17, 2003, at A19. The organization responded by 
suspending land sales and reviewing its governing documents and practices. Conservation Group 
Alters Rules After Criticism Over Its Practices, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at N17. 
 21.  Some scholars have begun to raise questions about whether institutions developed by 
NGOs funded with private resources accurately represent the interests of the public or civil 
sector. See Thomas P. Lyon, Introduction to GOOD COP, BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS 
AND THEIR STRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 1, 5 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010). 
 22.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 420; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545–49 (2000). 
 23.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 420. 
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authority to private firms.24 Firms and government authorities may 
jointly negotiate standards and implementation processes.25 
Governments now offer voluntary programs and negotiated 
agreements as new hybrid forms of regulation26 and have begun to 
incorporate “soft law”27 and “reflexive law” elements into regulatory 
regimes.28 Many private governance institutions mimic programs 
developed and funded by government.29 Some private governance 
structures exist in the shadow of the law.30 In some instances, it is the 
threat of future government regulation that causes private actors with 
vested interests to develop private governance structures in the first 
place.31 Private firms would not have developed other private 
governance institutions if the courts were not available to enforce 
 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 33–37 (1997). 
 27.  See John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction to HARD CHOICES, SOFT 
LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL 
GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004); Jason M. Solomon, New 
Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory 
and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010); David M. Trubek & Louise Trubek, New 
Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUMB. J. 
EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007); Neil Walker & Grainne de Burca, Reconceiving Law & New 
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 519, 531 (2007). 
 28.  See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 27, at 548; Walker & de Burca, supra note 27, at 527 
(describing the shift from command-and-control regulation to these new forms). 
 29.  For example, following the success of the Toxic Release Inventory, a number of firms 
and organizations began to employ voluntary disclosure and reporting requirements to signal 
market differentiation. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental 
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 
257, 367 (2001). 
 30.  Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 
J. CORP. L. 325, 329 (2008) (citing Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A 
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982); Lisa Bernstein, Opting 
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (1992); and Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001)). 
 31.  The chemical industry, for example, developed the Responsible Care Program 
following the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal with the goal of avoiding the institution of 
regulations upon the chemical industry, and in 1992, following the Rio Summit, the Chamber of 
Commerce developed a Business Charter for Sustainable Development to deflect possible 
global environmental regulation. David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate 
Conduct, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 159, 167–68 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire 
Woods eds., 2009). 
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obligations under contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code or 
to impose common law or statutory tort liability against those firms.32 
Other scholars focus, in part, on stakeholder intent or motive, 
suggesting that regulatory failure in the private governance context is 
the result of mixed or compromised motives.33 However, stakeholders 
have a wide variety of motives for undertaking voluntary regulation. 
Firms undertake corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs 
primarily to reduce waste, improve efficiency, increase profits,34 
achieve market differentiation,35 adapt to shifting business norms and 
values,36 and enhance firm reputation with investors, markets, and 
consumers.37 Firms use contracts to regulate suppliers, reduce risks 
from contract and tort liability,38 and shift the risk of loss in 
transactions.39 Collectively, firms develop industry-wide codes of 
conduct to level the playing field among competitors and reduce the 
costs of compliance.40 Firms create and adhere to voluntary 
 
 32.  For instance, firms use contracts to control the quality of products being delivered 
through their supply chains to maintain quality standards. When the goods they sell are 
credence goods (goods for which neither they nor their consumers can tell the quality prior to 
purchase), firms are motivated by the risks associated with breach of contract claims and 
potential tort liability to set up private regulatory mechanisms. 
 33.  See Auld et al., supra note 9, at 416. 
 34.  Id. at 415; David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
261, 268–69 (2008) (suggesting that much of the business literature exaggerates the cost-savings 
or other “win–win” benefits from shifting to more sustainable practices, and indicating that 
studies have shown little correlation between financial performance and performance along 
social and environmental parameters). 
 35.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 415; Lyon, supra note 3, at 29; Mattli & Woods, supra note 
3, at 56; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 70. The need for market differentiation may 
arise from a disaster within the industry that has widespread negative impacts on public 
perception of the industry as a whole and could potentially lead to regulation. Vogel, supra note 
34, at 268. 
 36.  Id. at 269 (suggesting that changes in business mores have contributed significantly to 
the shift in business practices, and attributing this change to an expansion of firm accountability 
not only to shareholders but to other communities that are impacted by their decisions); Vogel, 
supra note 31, at 170; see also Benjamin Cashore et al., Can Non-State Global Governance Be 
Legitimate? An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOV. 347 (2007). But see Abbott & Snidal, 
supra note 9, at 70 (suggesting that while these kinds of responses to the logic of 
appropriateness may have long-term impacts, competition drives firms to reduce and externalize 
costs). 
 37.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 169. A firm’s desire to enhance its reputation may arise in 
response to activities by NGOs to shame and blame the firm or the industry through media 
exposes, protests, and boycotts. 
 38.  See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
2029, 2033–34 (2005). 
 39.  Id. at 2046–47. 
 40.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 169; Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 35. 
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regulations to seek favor with regulatory authorities and to insert 
themselves in the regulatory process.41 They also do so to reduce the 
degree of government monitoring that currently occurs,42 and to 
preempt proposed governmental regulation.43 Firms undertake hybrid 
approaches to governance when facing potential regulation,44 
preferring to negotiate standards and regulatory solutions over typical 
forms of state intervention.45 In addition, investor pressures46 and 
efforts by NGOs to hold companies responsible for the 
environmental and social impacts of their activities and the activities 
of their supply chains have driven participation in private governance 
regimes.47 
Government entities also have a broad array of reasons for 
collaborating with business and nonprofit entities in voluntary 
regulatory schemes. Governmental entities may decide to support 
these alternatives because (1) a given governmental entity lacks 
authority to develop a mandatory program,48 (2) a voluntary program 
may offer an opportunity to test new approaches through pilot 
projects,49 (3) a voluntary program may reduce the costs of obtaining 
environmental improvement compared to traditional command-and-
 
 41.  Lyon, supra note 3, at 58. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. An increased threat of governmental regulation will increase firm attempts at 
corporate self-regulation. Lyon suggests that regulatory preemption may decrease political 
transaction costs and leaves open the possibility that consumers will organize if preemption 
measures do not result in sufficient environmental improvement. See also Vogel, supra note 34, 
at 268 (“In some cases, business self-regulation represents a political strategy for avoiding 
additional government regulation.”) 
 44.  Id. at 57. The choice to engage is thought to follow a nonlinear model. Id. at 66. Some 
voluntary mechanisms, such as public voluntary programs, are undertaken when the threat of 
regulation is weak, and others, such as negotiated agreements, when the threat is stronger. Id. at 
57. Firms would tend to pursue voluntary abatement if the threat of government regulation is 
low or if the threat of governmental regulation is high. Id. at 66. Intermediate threats of 
regulation would not appear to prompt firms to take action. Id. 
 45.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 420. 
 46.  Philipp Pattberg, The Institutionalization of Private Governance: How Business and 
Nonprofit Organizations Agree on Transnational Rules, 18 GOVERNANCE 589, 598–602 (2005) 
(describing the development of a global reporting initiative from demands by investors for 
information on firm environmental performance to permit investors to assess the risk of their 
investments). 
 47.  Vogel, supra note 34, at 268 (noting that the top reason for firms accepting private 
governance is that NGOs make global brands and global supply networks into a source of 
vulnerability through “name and shame campaigns”). 
 48.  See Lyon, supra note 3, at 60–61. 
 49.  See id. at 60. 
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control regulation,50 or (4) a voluntary program may improve 
government–business relationships.51 
Regardless of which sector or set of stakeholders develops the 
standards, and no matter their motives for doing so, some structures 
are effective and beneficial to society while others are not. 
Correlations between stakeholder intent and effectiveness may not be 
consistent. Voluntary standards promulgated by NGOs that are 
neither strict nor enforceable will not abate risks or internalize 
potential costs into the price of the goods—the risk of loss will remain 
with the general public. On the other hand, voluntary efforts by firms 
that involve a shift to new technology may guarantee improved 
environmental performance and save the government and the 
taxpayer significant costs associated with monitoring. The lines drawn 
between public and business interests obscure important structures 
needed for effective regulation. 
In summary, classifying governance systems based on the 
composition of their constituents misses the point; the purpose of 
classification is to predict which private governance institutions will 
meet public demand for governance and which will not. Because the 
conventional taxonomy is limited in descriptive and analytical 
capacity, a new paradigm for examining private governance 
institutions is needed. The next section formulates a new typology 
based on the functions that private governance institutions serve in 
addressing government and market failures. 
II.  HOW PRIVATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS OVERCOME 
GOVERNMENT FAILURES THAT OCCUR AT EACH STAGE OF 
REGULATION AND ADDRESS MARKET FAILURE 
Abbott and Snidal identify five stages of regulatory activity 
captured by the acronym “ANIME”: (1) agenda-setting, (2) 
negotiation of standards, (3) implementation, (4) monitoring, and (5) 
enforcement.52 At each stage, the process may break down, 
undermining the purpose for which the regulations are being 
promulgated. Formal governments fail to regulate successfully for a 
number of reasons: (1) lack of authority, resources, or political will to 
regulate at all; (2) inability to coordinate and collaborate across 
jurisdictional boundaries; (3) inability to generate regulation that sets 
 
 50.  See id. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 46. 
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enforceable standards; (4) inability to monitor and enforce the 
standards that they have set;53 and (5) diversion of the regulatory 
process by interested actors to their own purposes. In addition, the 
allocation of responsibility and the costs associated with developing, 
implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the rules can also give rise 
to a breakdown in the regulatory process.54 
This section describes the different stages of regulation and the 
kinds of barriers and hazards that prevent formal government from 
regulating or cause public regulation to fail to serve the public 
interest. Because demand for governance remains unmet, a 
regulatory gap exists that private governance systems can fill. This 
section, therefore, also describes how private governance institutions 
address these governance deficits. 
A.  Agenda-Setting Institutions 
At the initial stage of the governmental regulatory process, 
public interest, industry, or business groups identify an agenda they 
would like to have their legislative or regulatory bodies meet. Parties 
bearing externalized social costs articulate their concerns, investigate 
activities that cause those harms, identify the parties engaging in 
those activities, and appeal to government actors to regulate those 
activities. Abbott and Snidal identify this stage as the “Agenda-
Setting” stage.55 
Before any regulation can occur, legislators or regulatory bodies 
must be aware of social costs. Because ecological systems behave in 
nonlinear ways, many social costs, such as those associated with 
environmental harm,56 are not readily apparent.57 In addition, 
 
 53.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 160. 
 54. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 262–63 (2009) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY] (“When the rules related to the 
distribution of benefits are made broadly consistent with the distribution of costs, participants 
are more willing to pitch in to keep a resource well-maintained and sustainable. Relating user 
inputs to the benefits they obtain is a crucial element of establishing a fair system. If some users 
get all the benefits and pay few of the costs, others are not willing to follow rules over time. 
Thus, fairness is a crucial attribute of the rules of robust systems.” (citations omitted)). 
 55.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 8, at 63–64. 
 56.  For those concerned about natural resources and ecological systems, the damage 
suffered by these systems may be difficult to discern or estimate. Oran R. Young, Institutions 
and Environmental Change: The Scientific Legacy of a Decade of IDGEC Research, in 
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 3 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
Young, Institutions and Environmental Change]. Biological systems frequently behave in non-
linear ways, and are subject to thresholds and tipping points. Id. Collapse may be imminent, but 
the signs may not be readily apparent. Id. Ecological systems also behave in a non-linear 
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globalization has shifted manufacturing from developed to 
developing nations, making social harms borne by residents in 
developing countries less visible to those enjoying lower prices that 
result from externalizing those costs.58 Proponents of regulation must 
also identify the parties responsible for those social harms and 
persuade legislative bodies to take action. However, effective 
oversight requires information, and gathering information can be 
costly and difficult.59 In addition, identifying affected parties and 
coordinating them to engage across vast geographic distances, 
thereby bridging cultural, technological, and language barriers, is 
challenging. A number of private governance institutions have arisen 
to address this need. 
In recent years, NGOs, church groups, and other advocacy 
organizations have begun to identify social and environmental costs 
and disseminate information to spur action by legislative bodies. 
These education and mobilization initiatives, however, are not the 
source of all private regulatory activity. Insurance companies now 
lobby regulatory bodies for new regulation and mandate certain 
practices among their insured parties that will reduce the companies’ 
risk of loss. Socially responsible investment (SRI) firms use capital 
markets and screening programs to incentivize firm management to 
shift firm practices into alignment with their investors’ social and 
environmental concerns. Voluntary standards, certification, and 
labeling mechanisms cultivate consumer markets to select products 
from firms that conform to specified social and environmental 
practices. 
 
manner: they are frequently subject to thresholds and tipping points, and collapse can occur 
quickly after a long period of what appears to be incremental change. Oran R. Young, 
Governance for Sustainable Development in a World of Rising Interdependencies, in 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 12, 39 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter Young, Governance for Sustainable Development]. 
 57.  Occasionally, catastrophic events, such as the Bhopal disaster, coffee collapse, labor 
scandals, or human rights scandals will bring these social costs to public attention. 
 58.  See Vogel, supra note 31, at 159. 
 59.  Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 28; see, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Tracking Flow of Oil on 
His Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011, at A17 (describing efforts of a conservationist to gather 
and disseminate information on the environmental impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
after being frustrated with government efforts to do so). While technology has advanced 
communication to a level that government censorship becomes less feasible on a global scale, 
some governments are still able to exert control over information either by limiting media 
access or through disinformation campaigns. See, e.g., William Yong & Robert F. Worth, Iran 
Clamps Down on Reporting on Protest Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A4; Andrew 
Jacobs & Miguel Helft, Google, Citing Attack, Threatens to Exit China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2010, at A1. 
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1.  Education and Mobilization Initiatives 
Increasingly, civic organizations have taken an entrepreneurial 
role in exposing social costs by communicating them to the public and 
galvanizing action with respect to environmental and social 
concerns.60 Since the 1980s, NGOs, churches, and other groups have 
developed civil society campaigns to draw into question the activities 
of certain high-profile business entities and groups.61 The groups have 
assumed the costs associated with gathering information about firm 
performance,62 and used media campaigns to disseminate information 
about the environmental and social impacts of firm activities.63 Civic 
organizations, in addition to disclosing social costs and identifying the 
parties that have contributed to the problem, may also communicate 
this information to the public in a way that will prompt action.64 They 
may offer a plan for action to empower the public to overcome 
collective action problems and call for institutional change either in 
the form of legislation, enforcement of existing regulations, or, if 
those needs will not be met by formal government, by galvanizing 
interest groups to develop private governance institutions.65 
 
 60.  Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 29 (describing the efforts of Greenpeace, Amnesty 
International, and the Sierra Club in seeking a regulatory response to the Union Carbide 
disaster in Bhopal, India); Vogel, supra note 31, at 168–70 (describing the name and shame 
campaigns directed against unhealthy working conditions and the employment of child laborers 
by textile and clothing manufacturers, human rights violations and environmental harms by 
mining companies, and sourcing of illegally and unsustainably harvested wood by lumber 
retailers). For example, in 1997 the Rainforest Action Network undertook a highly visible 
campaign against Home Depot to urge the company to stop purchasing wood and paper 
products from old growth forests and substitute sustainably harvested wood sources. Jennifer 
Krill, Rainforest Action Network, in GOOD COP, BAD COP: ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND 
THEIR STRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 208, 218–19 (Thomas P. Lyon ed., 2010). 
 61.  Sasha Courville, Social Accountability Audits: Challenging or Defending Democratic 
Governance?, 25 LAW & POL’Y 269, 271 (2003). 
 62.  Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 28–29 (attributing this phenomenon, in part, to the 
availability of the Internet, which reduced the costs of communication and information 
gathering). 
 63.  Courville, supra note 61, at 271. 
 64.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 64; Vogel, supra note 31, at 168–69 (name-and-
shame campaigns directed at prominent firms identify shortfalls in corporate responsibility). 
 65.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 171 (“[A] critical role has been played by NGOs whose anti-
corporate campaigns have creatively taken advantage of the vulnerability of global firms to 
threats to their public reputation and the value of their brands. . . . [T]hese organizations have 
effectively mobilized the diffuse interests of those adversely affected by the shortcomings of 
existing regulatory mechanisms. Their efforts to create new forms of business regulation have 
been often supported by foundations, trade unions, social movements, and in some cases, 
governments.”); see also Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 28–29 (describing the emergence of 
NGOs as policy entrepreneurs). 
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As a result of these campaigns, targeted companies are shifting 
their practices to reduce their negative environmental and social 
impacts through private governance initiatives, such as adoption of 
CSR programs,66 codes of conduct, environmental management 
systems, and through participation in government-based hybrid 
efforts, such as public voluntary programs and negotiated 
agreements.67 Corporate involvement in these programs stems from 
the desire to upgrade the firm image,68 to reduce financial risks 
associated with education and mobilization initiatives and “name and 
shame” campaigns, and generally to restore the firm’s social license to 
operate.69 
2.  Insurance Contracts 
Insurance companies are also acting as regulatory 
entrepreneurs.70 Insurance agreements generally enhance efficiency 
by permitting parties to spread compliance risks and create 
economies of scale in managing remediation costs.71 Facing increased 
exposure to higher risk, insurance firms have also begun to demand 
additional regulation.72 For example, in the shipping industry, traffic 
on navigable waters has risen from expanded trade and increased 
tanker size.73 This has increased the likelihood of accidents, leading to 
larger payouts associated with lost cargo and environmental and 
other harms to natural resources and human communities.74 In 
response to increased risk and higher payouts, insurance firms have 
taken a more active role in lobbying for regulation of the shipping 
 
 66.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 417. 
 67.  Lyon, supra note 3, at 56–63. Because formal governments initiate and fund hybrid 
programs, such as public voluntary programs and negotiated agreements, this article does not 
cover them to any degree. 
 68.  See Robert Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does 
Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 69 (2003) (noting that some managers seek to 
avoid negative publicity and maintain their social license with their communities by going 
beyond compliance with mandatory environmental standards). 
 69.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 417. 
 70.  Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 33. 
 71.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2063 (noting that, among other things, these 
policies can cover past liabilities, costs associated with future requirements for compliance, and 
cost overruns on projects to clean up an environmentally damaged property). 
 72.  Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 33. 
 73.  Samuel Barrows, Racing to the Top . . . at Last: The Regulation of Safety in Shipping, in 
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 189, 202–06 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 
2009). 
 74.  Id. 
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industry75 and in enforcing regulations through their contracts.76 While 
individual insurers could impose additional requirements or decline 
to insure firms that failed to meet their standards, these insurance 
companies and their clients would face a competitive disadvantage. 
By seeking government regulation, insurance companies level the 
playing field for themselves and their clients. 
3.  Socially Responsible Investment 
Investors also harness the market to pressure firms to manage 
their environmental and other risks.77 Focusing primarily on publicly-
held firms, SRI firms direct investors to companies that achieve their 
financial goals in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.78 
By offering early recognition and the advantages associated with 
expanded access to capital, SRI firms provide economic incentives for 
companies to undertake social and environmental harm abatement or 
other activities associated with meeting investor preferences. While 
some institutional investors support particular governmental or 
intergovernmental initiatives,79 others have developed programs to 
screen firms based on their performance across a number of social 
parameters, going beyond firm profitability or return on investment.80 
SRIs provide information to investors about the environmental and 
social performance of firms, primarily publicly held firms.81 SRI 
research organizations may collect information by sending 
questionnaires to companies to self-report their activities, or SRI 
research organizations may pull information provided by reporting 
and disclosure initiatives or certification programs.82 The information 
is rarely verified independently.83 SRI firms screen companies to 
assemble portfolios of investments, and select investments that meet 
 
 75.  Id. at 203. 
 76.  Id. at 202. 
 77.  Kagan et al., supra note 68, at 82. 
 78.  Courville, supra note 61, at 274. 
 79.  See Cynthia Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas 
Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 488–89 (2003) (describing the involvement of 
institutional investors managing $3 trillion in assets in the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative, designed to require extractive industry companies to disclose amounts paid to foreign 
governments for rights to extract natural resources). 
 80.  These programs may employ an array of approaches, including screens for positive 
qualities, screens against negative qualities, and screens to identify the best of a class of 
investments without regard to any minimum criteria. Courville, supra note 61, at 274. 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
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positive investor preferences or screen investments to exclude firms 
that engage in activities that investors have elected to avoid.84 SRI 
firms may also assemble portfolios by identifying the best performing 
firms in each sector without identifying a minimum threshold for 
performance.85 While initial participants were individual investors and 
thus the size of funds under management was small, recent entry of 
institutional investors such as state pension funds, universities, and 
foundations has increased the funds under management 
dramatically.86 
It is unclear whether investment in socially responsible firms 
produces desired environmental and social outcomes. If a firm’s 
standards are not sufficiently prescriptive or stringent, they may have 
little impact. Because no information verification systems exist 
regarding firms’ self-reported information, the effectiveness of the 
selection and screening process has yet to be determined. Given that 
social and environmental performance are “credence qualities,”87 
firms may not provide accurate reports of their performance unless 
there is some method to monitor activity, verify self-reported 
performance, and provide a credible threat of sanction. In addition, 
leakage88 remains a problem: as long as noncompliant businesses may 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Performance and Socially Responsible Investments, FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, http://www.ussif.org/resources/performance.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 
2011) (indicating a 480% increase in funds under professionally managed SRIs from 1995 to 
2010). A number of studies have shown that SRI funds perform comparably to non-SRI mutual 
funds. See, e.g., id.; Meir Statman & Denys Glushkov, The Wages of Social Responsibility (Dec. 
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.); Center for 
Responsible Business, University of California (Berkeley) Haas School of Business, Key 
Studies, STUDIES OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING, http://www.sristudies.org/ 
Key+Studies (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). Some SRI funds are benchmarked against non-SRI 
indices, such as the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and in some instances have 
outperformed these standard indices. FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTMENT, supra. 
 87.  Credence qualities cannot easily be evaluated before, during, or after normal use. To 
determine whether the good has the properties or qualities that a consumer prefers, the 
consumer would be required to undertake expensive studies to acquire additional information. 
In some instances, it may not be possible for the consumer to learn whether the good has 
preferred qualities. Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount 
of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68–69 (1973). 
 88.  Leakage occurs when a market responds to the imposition of a regulation by shifting 
demand to goods that are manufactured in jurisdictions where the regulation is not imposed. 
When prices increase as a result of regulation, consumers continue to seek lower priced goods 
and purchase the goods from jurisdictions where production of the goods are not subject to 
regulations and can therefore be manufactured and sold at a lower price. 
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obtain capital from alternate sources on similar terms, they may 
retain a competitive advantage over compliant firms by continuing to 
externalize the social costs.89 
4.  Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems are 
private governance institutions that set minimum standards for firms, 
products, or facilities to meet one or more consumer preferences.90 
They designate a process to verify whether the standards have been 
met, provide training for individuals who will inspect the goods or 
facilities to verify whether they are in compliance with the standards, 
certify the goods or firms that have met the standards, and develop 
labels to identify the compliant goods and firms.91 These regimes use 
 
 89.  Note, however, that social costs may impact a firm’s risk profile. To the extent that a 
firm’s activities give rise to grave environmental impacts, civil unrest, work stoppages, media 
attention, and injunctive relief or regulatory activity, economic risks to investors increase. Public 
awareness of these risks can result in a shift of capital away from these firms. See, e.g., Michael 
P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global 
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 943–44 (2007) (stating disclosure of environmental release 
information through the mandatory Toxic Release Inventory affected the stock prices for firms 
with the worst records). 
 90.  These systems go by many names in the different literature. Some scholars call these 
institutions non-state market-driven (NMSD) systems. See Benjamin Cashore et al., Can Non-
State Governance ‘Ratchet Up’ Global Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest 
Sector, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 158, 162–66 (2007). Others have 
identified them as regulatory standards setting (RSS) forms of private governance. See Abbott 
& Snidal, supra note 9, at 44–45. Others, in the business world refer to all forms of private 
governance as “civil regulation.” See Vogel, supra note 31, at 151. One example of a voluntary 
standards, certification, and labeling institution is the Forest Stewardship Council. Following 
recognition of the tragedy of the commons dynamic with respect to forests in the 1960s, many 
governments elected to privatize their forests. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23 (1990) 
[hereinafter GOVERNING THE COMMONS]. In some cases, government ownership of the forests 
has not made them less susceptible to illegal logging, but more so where governments have 
lacked the capacity to monitor and enforce the law. Id. In an attempt to reverse this trend, the 
Forest Stewardship Council has developed a system to help enforce existing national laws 
against illegal logging by encouraging the logging industry, forest owners, and indigenous 
populations to adopt sustainable forest management practices and deter illegal logging by 
joining the certification program. See FSC Policy and Standards, FOREST STEWARDSHIP 
COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org/policy_standards.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). The 
organization certifies and labels forests, forest products, and firms that sell those products. In 
exchange for their participation, forest owners and managers and retailers that sell certified 
forest products may receive a premium on products they sell. This market premium has not 
always eventuated. Michael Richards, Certification in Complex Socio-political Settings: Looking 
Forward to the Next Decade, in FOREST TRENDS 26 (2004). 
 91.  Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be 
Democratic?, 8 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 513, 515 (2008); Cashore et al., supra note 90, at 162–66. 
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the supply chain to create financial incentives for performance.92 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems may create or 
capitalize on activist pressure directed toward supply chain anchor 
firms in the form of media campaigns, protests, and actual or 
threatened boycotts.93 Firms committing to become members of the 
certification and labeling system or committing to purchase certified 
goods avoid these pressures.94 
In addition, voluntary standards, certification, and labeling 
systems are thought to shape public perception of social or 
environmental problems by shifting the discourse around social and 
environmental goods.95 When the dominant discourse changes, 
institutional change occurs.96 Voluntary standards, certification, and 
labeling systems target consumer demand by activating norms 
associated with consumption.97 By using labels to make externalities 
more visible, voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems 
also enhance efficiency; when consumers confront the environmental 
impacts of their consumption choices and have the opportunity to pay 
a premium to internalize the externality, they may choose the good 
with a lower environmental or other social cost.98 These systems not 
only enable customers to express existing preferences, but they also 
shift those preferences by providing information, rankings, and third-
party certification. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling 
systems engender and strengthen norms associated with fair trade, 
fair wage and labor practices, sustainable harvesting, and the 
avoidance of environmental harm.99 By educating and informing 
consumers about the consequences of their purchases, these 
institutions seek to inculcate certain values and encourage consumers 
to internalize standards and set boundaries on what they will and will 
not consume. 
Table 1 summarizes the hazards that arise at the agenda-setting 
stage, the private governance institutions that address those hazards, 
 
 92.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 424–25. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 8. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Norms are internalized rules; individuals who fail to observe norms experience mental 
discomfort and may be shunned within their community. Michael A. Livermore, Reviving 
Environmental Protection: Preference Directed Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 25 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 311, 332–33 (2007). 
 98.  Id. at 330. 
 99.  Id. at 326–28. 
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what they supply, and the characteristics required for the institutions 
to be effective. 
 
 
Table 1. Agenda-Setting Institutions 
 
Barrier or Hazard Suppliers Structure Supplied Keys for Effectiveness 
Information 
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B.  Standards-Setting Institutions 
At the second stage of the regulatory process, legislative and 
regulatory bodies and stakeholders negotiate and set standards and 
develop a regulatory scheme for monitoring compliance and 
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enforcing those standards.100 However, even when private business 
incentives and the public will to regulate exist, a number of barriers 
may impede the legislative process, such as collective action 
problems, regulatory capture, and rent seeking activity. Businesses 
regulate internally to improve their performance along social and 
environmental lines, to enhance their image among investors and 
lenders, to regain their social license to operate, and to differentiate 
themselves in the market so as to achieve a “green” or socially 
responsible premium. Supply chain contracts import standards into 
jurisdictions where democratic and legal institutions are weak. 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling mechanisms create 
market incentives and lower transaction costs to overcome regulatory 
capture, regulatory fragmentation, and the “race to the bottom.” 
1.  Business Firm Programs 
Business firms often engage in a particular self-regulatory 
activity commonly described as CSR.101 Firms generally set their own 
policies without input from other parties,102 employ existing 
management structures to implement those policies, use internal 
hierarchies to obtain feedback about policy impacts, and incentivize 
compliance through compensation, honors, and other perquisites.103 In 
general, firms that undertake CSR seek a win–win situation; they 
hope to increase efficiency and firm profits by reducing waste and 
unnecessary costs, and by developing new markets through 
differentiation to generate premium prices.104 
2.  Supply Chain Contracts 
A number of scholars now focus on supply chain contracts as a 
source of environmental and social regulation.105 Firms experience 
pressures to control suppliers from a variety of sources, including the 
 
 100.  At the rulemaking stage of the regulatory process, formal governments have begun to 
draw on the types of innovations that have arisen in private governance. In setting standards 
and developing new rules, governments have begun to require that firms network with and 
share information with stakeholders, and include stakeholders in the deliberative regulatory 
processes. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 27, at 555. 
 101.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 414. 
 102.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 67. 
 103.  Id. at 65. 
 104.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 422. 
 105.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 925–26; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. 
Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 226–
29 (2010); Lyon, supra note 21, at 22. 
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threat of contract or tort liability,106 consumer demand, targeting by 
name and shame campaigns and boycotts,107 and pressures from 
socially responsible investors,108 firm managers, and owners. Because 
investors are also concerned with the long-term supply of the raw 
materials and products used in their business, investors have begun to 
pressure firms to control firm suppliers’ operations and activities to 
ensure that the raw materials and harvested products will be available 
for the future.109 
Supply chain contracts and operations permit anchor firms to 
transfer technology and management skills to countries where the 
rule of law and the regulatory apparatus is weak.110 When retail firms 
are subject to regulatory controls in one jurisdiction but their supply 
chain contractors reside in jurisdictions where regulatory standards 
either do not exist or are not enforced, the retail firms use contractual 
arrangements to ensure that their contractors comply with firm 
quality control requirements. While common law or statutory tort or 
contract law establishes the regulatory agenda in the jurisdiction of 
the anchor firm, these laws have no effect in foreign jurisdictions. 
Anchor firms must therefore use contracts to set and enforce the 
standards within foreign jurisdictions. In such cases, global supply 
chain contracts have been described as “transplanting” social and 
environmental standards in foreign countries.111 While the corporate 
goal may simply be to meet government, investor, and consumer 
demands, a corporation’s exercise of bargaining power and 
contractual enforcement benefits the residents of countries in which 
environmental and labor regulation has been precluded because of 
democracy deficits or race to the bottom dynamics.112 
 
 106.  Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2031. 
 107.  Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 947. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 949. 
 110.  See id. at 942–56. In general, these requirements extend only to first-tier suppliers and 
would have little impact on suppliers further up the manufacturing chain. Id. As an empirical 
matter, countries with strong supply chains also tend to have fair labor practices and improved 
environmental performance. See e.g., Thomas P. Lyon & Bart van Hoof, Evaluating Mexico’s 
Green Supply Chains Program (2010) (unpublished report to the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation), http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/PDF/Working%20Papers/ 
Lyon%20Van%20Hoof%20GSC%20Paper%20Sep%2013%202010.pdf. 
 111.  Blair et al., supra note 30, at 337–38; see also Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through 
Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 711, 714–16 (2009); Vandenbergh, supra note 89. 
 112.  Cf. Lin, supra note 111, at 716. (describing how private contracting exports the political 
considerations of the “home” country to the country of the supplier). While the low levels of 
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3.  Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems 
Legislative and regulatory bodies may fail to regulate for a 
number of reasons despite public demand for regulation. First, 
legislative and regulatory bodies may be concerned about conflicting 
policies,113 and may be uncertain about the impacts of regulation.114 
Second, regulatory authorities may be fragmented115 or engaged in 
race to the bottom dynamics.116 And finally, legislative and regulatory 
authorities may also be subject to capture or corruption. A number of 
private governance institutions meet the demand for regulation 
through alternative structures that resist these hazards. 
Private governance institutions are sometimes developed in 
situations where legislators face uncertainty about the most efficient 
 
implementation may not yet result in substantial environmental and social benefits, the influx 
appears to have prompted the consideration, and in some circumstances, the adoption of certain 
legal reforms. Id. at 737 (noting that the ISO 14001 standards have become legal measures in 
China). 
 113.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 57–58 (noting that regulation may be seen as 
conflicting with economic growth). For instance, at the international level, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement prohibits trade discrimination 
against “like goods.” Vogel, supra note 31, at 161. Governments may post regulations that make 
“product distinctions” based on characteristics that inhere in the goods, but they are barred 
from making “process distinctions” that relate to the process by which the goods are made. 
Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Product/Process Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 531 (2004). Process distinctions, such 
as whether distinctions based on labor standards, human rights conditions, or the environmental 
impacts associated with the manufacture and distribution of products, may be challenged as 
non-tariff barriers to trade. See Vogel, supra note 31, at 161. If states maintain these kinds of 
regulatory standards in the face of a challenge, they may subject the state to retaliatory trade 
sanctions. While the law remains somewhat uncertain because cases before the WTO lack 
precedential value and because there are a number of exceptions to the doctrine, the product–
process distinction generally bars governments from imposing these kinds of regulatory 
standards. There are limits to the reach of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 
however. In general, international treaties apply only to the nation–states that are signatories to 
the agreements. They do not apply to corporate or individual actors or to multinational 
organizations. Nor do they extend to the activities of private parties unless those actions may be 
attributed to the states. See David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: 
Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 95 (2009); 
Williams, supra note 79, at 481. Consequently, there is an opening for private governance to 
meet public demand. 
 114.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58 (noting that regulators often lack information, 
resources, and technical competence). 
 115.  See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2003). In such circumstances, agencies vie with one 
another for authority. Examples of regulatory fragmentation include authority over regional 
land use decisions, control of genetically modified organizations, and control over the release of 
toxic substances into the environment under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 
 116.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58. 
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allocation of entitlements. Voluntary standards, certification, and 
labeling are institutions that facilitate the operation of “Rule Four,”117 
as contemplated by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed in their 
seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability 
Rules: One View of the Cathedral.118 These institutions allow parties to 
overcome an existing allocation of entitlements through trade by 
reducing the transaction costs associated with finding willing buyers 
and sellers, coordinating an exchange, negotiating a price, and 
verifying that the purchased goods are what they claim to be.119 
While legislators may occasionally allocate entitlements 
inefficiently because of uncertainty, an improper allocation of rights 
may also occur because of legislative or agency capture. In these 
situations, legislators or bureaucrats promulgate regulations that are 
more favorable to targeted industries than to the public.120 Regulatory 
capture frequently occurs in countries where there are democracy 
deficits.121 Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems 
 
 117.  Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards, 
Certification and Labeling Systems (unpublished manuscript, University of Louisville Working 
Papers), at 3–5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934274. 
 118.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In this article, 
Calabresi and Melamed summarize certain rules that Calabresi developed in his previous 
writings for governments to allocate entitlements in the presence of transaction costs. Id. at 
1096–97; see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970). In the case of pollution, legislators must make a choice between two opposing 
entitlements: they may grant a firm the right to pollute or grant the public the right to be free of 
pollution. Sometimes there is uncertainty about the costs and benefits associated with regulation 
and failure to regulate. There may also be uncertainty about the distributional impacts of 
regulation versus the status quo. Because of these kinds of uncertainty, an incorrect or 
inefficient allocation of entitlements may occur. Under Rule Three, Calabresi and Melamed 
suggest that if legislators are uncertain about whether a legal entitlement is worth its cost to 
society, they should allocate the costs to the party that will be able to avoid the social cost most 
cheaply (the “cheapest cost avoider”). Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1096–97. If legislators 
are uncertain about which party would be the cheapest cost avoider, they should allocate the 
costs to the party that can most cheaply (a) locate the cheapest cost avoider and (b) pay them to 
avoid those costs. Id. at 1097. In THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, Calabresi describes this party as 
“the best briber.” CALABRESI, supra, at 150. 
 119.  Roberts, supra note 117, at 5–6. 
 120.  Buzbee, supra note 115, at 44–45 (“Most significantly the path-breaking early work of 
Professors Stigler, Becker, and Petzman is primarily concerned with how diverse interest groups 
will compete for regulatory spoils. The result of this competition is typically not excessively 
burdensome regulation addressing social ills, but regulation favoring regulatory targets, weak 
regulation or no regulation at all.”). See generally Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1965). 
 121.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 66–67; Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 15 (noting 
that a lack of “relative inclusiveness, openness, transparency, fairness, and accessibility of 
regulatory institutions” will correlate with regulatory capture); Vogel, supra note 31, at 160 (“It 
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avoid capture through a number of structures. First, they frequently 
split membership and voting rights into three groups: (1) private firm 
or industry representatives, (2) government representatives, officials, 
and agencies, and (3) NGOs and other public interest and civic 
groups.122 This division allows each interest to participate in the 
deliberative process, but limits the power of any one group to 
dominate the institution.123 Second, decentralization deters capture.124 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems employ 
substantive rules that reflect broader legal and social norms, and 
include structures that provide for transparency and procedural due 
process and encourage inclusive and broad participation by various 
interest groups.125 Many of these systems permit participation by any 
“interested party” and some provide structures and funding to 
support participation by underrepresented groups.126 
Even when entitlements have been allocated appropriately and 
legislative and administrative bodies have not been captured, 
commons dynamics may deter government action in redressing 
adverse distributional impacts. Regulatory fragmentation—a split in 
government authority over persons, places, or regulatory subject 
matter—situates agencies in an anti-commons127 dynamic with respect 
 
is the inability or unwillingness of states to adopt or enforce [government controls over global 
firms and markets] that has contributed to the development and growth of non-state-based 
governance institutions.”); Vogel, supra note 34, at 266 (“Underlying virtually every scholarly 
and popular discussion of global civil regulation is the claim that the global economy suffers 
from a democratic governance deficit, often attributed to the constraints posed by global 
competitive pressures on the willingness and capacity of states to effectively regulate both 
global and domestic firms.”). 
 122.  For example, the Forest Stewardship Council has a global “general assembly” made up 
of three chambers—economic, environmental, and social—with equal voting power. Meidinger, 
supra note 91, at 523. 
 123.  Id. at 519. Many of these institutions follow the guidelines developed by the ISEAL 
Alliance for developing standards, measuring and evaluating performance, and accrediting 
auditors. See List of Full Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/ 
organisation/full_members (last visited Sept. 17, 2011). 
 124.  See Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 11 n.31; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 79. 
 125.  See Meidinger, supra note 91, at 532–33; see also UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL 
DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 263–64 (noting that when rules have been made by a local elite or 
a government agency, research reveals higher levels of theft and free-riding; in contrast, when 
those that are governed by the rules have made the rules, participants show increased 
cooperation). 
 126.  Meidinger, supra note 91, at 526–27. Some institutions provide resources to permit 
low-income individuals and those representing minority interests to participate. 
 127.  See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The 
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L. REV. 1163 (1999) (describing the dangers of 
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to regulatory turf.128 Examples of regulatory fragmentation include 
splits in authority over regional land use decisions between states, 
counties, and municipalities, and division of control of genetically 
modified organizations between the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug 
Administration. When multiple agencies are involved in a regulatory 
issue, they must communicate, coordinate, and potentially cede 
authority to regulate effectively. Transaction costs associated with 
communicating and collaborating increase as the number of parties 
required for consensus increases. Agencies may resist ceding 
authority or sharing information that could undermine that 
authority.129 The political benefits to an agency from hold-out130 are 
higher than the political rewards of regulation, which are split among 
the participating agencies.131 Furthermore, a regulatory breakdown is 
less visible and therefore less costly because the public cannot identify 
any one agency as the source of failure.132 Voluntary standards, 
certification, and labeling mechanisms overcome regulatory 
fragmentation by taking the conflict outside of the legal and 
regulatory system. These institutions bring all stakeholders together 
to resolve issues outside of government venues and without appeal to 
government authority.133 
Institutional dynamics may also lead to a tragedy of the 
commons134 at the regulatory level, creating incentives to deregulate.135 
Nations, states, counties, and municipalities frequently compete with 
one another to attract businesses and new residents. Competition 
between these jurisdictions to reduce taxes, exempt industries from 
regulation, and provide subsidies may result in a regulatory race to 
 
fragmentation of private property rights and interests). Buzbee extends this analysis to the 
fragmentation of regulation over land use and environmental matters. See Buzbee, supra note 
115, at 49–51. In such circumstances, agencies refuse to use their authority or spend resources to 
regulate because of communication, coordination, and collaboration problems and because the 
costs of regulation to the agency outweigh the benefits the agency will receive. 
 128.  See Buzbee, supra note 115, at 49–51. 
 129.  See id. at 50. 
 130.  Hold-out occurs when a necessary party to an agreement withholds consent, stymieing 
further progress. 
 131.  See Buzbee, supra note 115, at 33. 
 132.  Id. at 47. 
 133.  Note that frequently there is no government authority to which the stakeholders could 
appeal because of democracy deficits at the international level. See Vogel, supra note 34, at 266. 
 134.  See Buzbee, supra note 115, at 49–51 (2003). In such circumstances, agencies vie with 
one another for authority. 
 135.  See id. at 26; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58. 
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the bottom.136 Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems 
counter the race to the bottom by creating market incentives for 
stakeholders to eliminate, reduce, or internalize social costs. These 
systems generate countervailing subsidies to encourage stakeholders 
to reduce environmental and social harms and promote positive 
externalities.137 
Table 2 summarizes the challenges that arise at the negotiation of 
standards stage of the regulatory process, the private governance 
institutions that address those challenges, what they supply, and the 
characteristics private governance institutions must have to be 
effective. 
 
Table 2. Standards-Setting Institutions 
 












Information about cost 
savings  
 











 136.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 58. 
 137.  For instance, state and local governments often fail to perform regional planning. They 
compete for commercial, industrial, and residential developments in order to expand their tax 
bases, resulting in a race to the bottom. William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation 
Continuum, Westway and the Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J. L. & POL. 323, 351 (2005). 
The consequences include sprawl, traffic, loss of agricultural lands and wildlife habitat to 
commercial use, hollowing out of cities, urban blight and brownfields, heat island effects, 
groundwater pollution, flooding, and exposure to sewage wastes because of failure to separate 
and upgrade storm water infrastructure. In response to these social costs, members of the 
design, construction, and development industries; environmental organizations; and urban 
planners have developed the U.S. Green Building Council. See U.S. GREEN BUILDING 
COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). The Council addresses 
not only issues associated with poor land use planning, but also wasteful building design and 
construction practices through its Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
standards. The LEED rating system addresses these social costs by rewarding land use planning 
that avoids or internalizes these social costs. See Sustainable Sites Requirements, LEED for 
New Construction Rating System, in LEED REFERENCE GUIDE FOR GREEN BUILDING 
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (2009). 
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to prevent domination 
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informational access 
and avoid secrecy 
 
Deliberative, consensus 
structures for inclusive 
participation and to 











Structures to reduce 
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parties, negotiation 
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Protection of label 
against dilution, 
confusion, and fraud 
 
Democracy 




Supply standards via 
contract (based on 
tort law in 
jurisdiction of anchor 
firm) 




Mechanisms to enforce 
standards, contracts  
 
C.  Implementation Facilitators 
To the extent firms agree to comply with voluntary regulatory 
requirements, they may find the process of implementing the 
regulations burdensome.138 Small firms with fewer resources may find 
 
 138.  In the context of governmental regulation, firms that are the targets of regulation 
generally underwrite the costs of implementation and compliance with command-and-control 
regulations. These costs may vary widely among firms and are generally higher for older 
facilities with older technology, resulting in higher costs per unit of environmental 
improvement. These costs of implementation and compliance may also ultimately be passed 
forward to consumers or back to suppliers, shareholders, and employees. Governments have 
begun to look for more efficient ways to regulate. By shifting to market mechanisms, such as 
taxes, subsidies and cap-and-trade programs, governments have permitted the costs of 
compliance to be shared among all of the regulatory targets. To reduce these inefficiencies, 
governments have begun to incorporate a number of innovations developed by private 
governance institutions to reduce costs and accelerate the speed of adoption and 
implementation of new standards. These innovations are often referred to as the “new 
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the process prohibitively expensive. A number of private governance 
mechanisms have arisen to facilitate implementation of regulatory 
standards and lower the costs of compliance. These include models 
and meta-standards, learning initiatives, environmental management 
systems, and codes of conduct. These institutions reduce costs 
associated with compliance with both governmental and private 
standards and address market uncertainties that may impact 
voluntary efforts to internalize externalities. 
1.  Models and Meta-Standards 
A number of institutions have arisen to assist in the development 
of private governance by creating model structures and outlining 
procedures and criteria for the development of standards (“models” 
and “meta-standards”). Models, such as ISO 14001, provide general 
templates for firms to develop environmental management systems.139 
Models permit firms to implement these systems without having to 
construct the systems from scratch. The models thereby lower cost 
barriers and accelerate implementation of rules and structures. To the 
extent models provide guidelines for data collection and 
documentation, they also permit those concerned with compliance to 
compare the records of different firms or organizations. Meta-
standards (rules for setting rules) such as those developed by the 
ISEAL Alliance140 for voluntary standards, certification, and labeling 
 
governance.” To increase adoption and implementation of standards, they have also begun to 
include managerial style mechanisms. Pattberg, supra note 46. These include providing non-
mandatory guidelines and protocols; requiring firms to develop management plans, set 
benchmarks for performance, and use various metrics for measuring progress; and requesting 
that the firms share best practices with other regulated parties. See, e.g., Trubek & Trubek, 
supra note 27, at 555–57 (describing the European Water Development Framework and related 
Common Implementation Strategy). These mechanisms foster innovation, increase flexibility, 
and improve participation. Id. 
 139.  The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has expanded its role as a 
standards-setting institution for products and has begun to provide models for management 
systems, including environmental management systems. See, e.g., ISO 9000: Quality 
Management, ISO: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/quality_managem
ent.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
 140.  For example, the ISEAL Alliance provides guidance and models for voluntary 
standards, certification and labeling mechanisms. The organization shares best practices to help 
member organizations improve their effectiveness, increase their positive impacts, and maintain 
their credibility. See The ISEAL Alliance in 100 Words, ISEAL ALLIANCE, 
http://www.isealalliance.org/content/the-iseal-alliance-in-100-words (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
ISEAL Alliance establishes process requirements by which organizations develop, structure, 
and revise standards that provide for the process to be open, transparent, and broadly 
participatory. See ISEAL Codes of Good Practices, ISEAL ALLIANCE, 
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systems, provide guidance about how to develop effective rules and 
regulatory structures. These institutions reduce the costs of 
developing effective regulatory rules and structures by providing 
models, disseminating information about best practices, and 
providing a locus for their members to share information. 
Without models and meta-standards, the development of private 
governance institutions would be more expensive and less effective. 
Stakeholders would be forced to generate rules themselves or modify 
rules and structures from other industries. Models and meta-
standards also improve regulatory effectiveness. If standards fail to be 
sufficiently prescriptive or to include appropriate metrics for 
measuring improvement,141 the process of promulgating the standards 
may be seen as purely symbolic,142 increasing costs without procuring 
actual changes in social and environmental conditions. By identifying 
best practices to address the needs of particular industries, sectors, 
and stakeholders, models and meta-standards accelerate learning and 
facilitate institutional effectiveness. 
2.  Learning Initiatives 
Learning initiatives are programs designed to increase capacity 
within a firm to evaluate and improve social and environmental 
performance.143 Learning initiatives provide training to firm 
employees to facilitate the development and operation of 
 
http://www.isealalliance.org/content/codes-good-practice (last visited Sept 29, 2011). The 
organization also sets standards for measuring and evaluating the social and environmental 
impacts of the member organizations and the effectiveness of their systems. Id. Finally, the 
organization has accreditation and process requirements for the individuals or bodies that will 
audit and certify whether participants are in compliance with the organization’s standards with a 
view to ensuring that they are credible and accessible. See id. ISEAL Alliance provides training, 
tools, and technical support to its members. Members, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.ise 
alalliance.org/content/members (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). The ISEAL Alliance follows its own 
guidelines and procedures in setting standards for its member organizations. Code Development, 
ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/content/ 
code-development (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
 141.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 280. Without concrete performance benchmarks, it is 
difficult to measure whether a firm is improving over time or to make comparisons to other 
firms, which impacts the credibility of the system. Id. at 283. 
 142.  Id. at 287–88; Andrew King et al., The Strategic Use of Decentralized Institutions: 
Exploring Certification with ISO 14001 Management Standard, 48 ACAD. MGMT J. 1091, 1092–
94 (2005). 
 143.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 273–74. For example, the Ethical Trading Initiative 
assists firms in adopting management and reporting systems associated with labor practices and 
facilitates dispute resolution. Training, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethical 
trade.org/training (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). 
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accountability, auditing, and reporting systems.144 Firms generally 
participate in learning initiatives to receive reputational benefits and 
to reduce risks associated with name and shame campaigns, tort 
actions, labor disputes, and other events that reduce firm profitability. 
Firms may also be motivated to enroll in these programs to improve 
employee relationships and align their practices with the norms and 
values of senior management.145 Firms sometimes enroll in learning 
initiatives to receive reputational benefits, but fail to achieve 
compliance after enrolling in the program.146 
3.  Environmental Management Systems 
Firms have employed management systems for many years to 
improve firm operations and efficiency.147 More recently, firms have 
 
 144.  Id. at 273. The primary non-governmental example of a learning initiative is the 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI). See generally ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, 
http://www.ethicaltrade.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). ETI targets supply chains to improve 
labor practices throughout the world. About ETI, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, 
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The organization’s membership 
is comprised of firms, trade union organizations, and nonprofit organizations or voluntary civic 
institutions. Our Members, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-
eti/our-members (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). ETI helps firms evaluate their trade performance 
and set benchmarks to improve their performance over time. What We Do, ETHICAL TRADING 
INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The 
organization identifies best practices, provides training on implementation of those practices, 
initiates pilot projects, and brokers resolutions between companies, suppliers, and workers. Id. 
The organization also raises awareness among consumers, and provides training to firms on 
integrating ethical buying practices. Id. Finally, ETI requires firms to submit annual reports of 
their progress and conducts random validation visits to approximately twenty percent of its 
membership each year to validate the data and information contained in the report. What 
Companies Sign Up To, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-
eti/what-companies-sign-up-to (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). The organization provides a 
disciplinary procedure for companies that fail to implement the management systems and data 
collection processes within the benchmarked timeframes. The ultimate sanction is removal from 
the organization’s membership list. ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, PROCEDURE TO ENFORCE 
MEMBERSHIP OBLIGATION: CORPORATE MEMBERS (2009), available at http://www.ethical 
trade.org/resources/key-eti-resources/eti-disciplinary-procedure. The organization is supported 
through membership fees and grants from government agencies. Firms join the organization to 
benefit from the support structures and mediation processes to reduce the risk of strikes and 
work stoppage and to rehabilitate their reputations following adverse media exposure. Join ETI, 
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/get-involved/join-eti (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2012). 
 145.  Courville, supra note 61, at 271. 
 146.  See id. at 274. 
 147.  See, e.g., ISO 9001: 2008, ISO: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_ 
standards/quality_management/iso_9001_2008.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012); PHILIP B. 
CROSBY, LET’S TALK QUALITY: 96 QUESTIONS YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO ASK PHIL CROSBY 
(1989); KAORU ISHIKAWA, WHAT IS TOTAL QUALITY CONTROL? (David J. Lu trans., 1985). 
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begun to employ environmental management systems that focus 
specifically on firm environmental performance and the impacts of 
firm operations.148 The systems may include evaluation processes to 
determine the environmental impacts of a firm’s operations, policies 
designed to reduce those environmental impacts, plans for allocating 
resources and responsibility for implementing those policies, 
timelines for implementation, and organizational structures and 
hierarchies to assign responsibility for evaluating and reporting 
compliance. The systems help firms identify environmental problems 
and build capacity for change.149 The systems may, but do not 
necessarily, provide specific goals for the firm to accomplish, 
benchmarks to measure progress in meeting those goals, and 
timelines for meeting those benchmarks and tracking improvement. 
Firms may develop their own systems or they may reduce the time 
and resources that they must invest by using models and meta-
standards, which identify programs and processes that have already 
been tried, tested, and distilled into best practices.150 Environmental 
management systems also facilitate the inculcation of values and a 
shift in firm norms through the logic of appropriateness.151 
Because each firm may develop its own standards, environmental 
management systems are thought to lower the barriers to entry to 
environmental improvement, thereby increasing participation in the 
systems. By stressing continual improvement, the systems are thought 
 
 148.  For example, ISO 14001 provides a standardized set of guidelines that firms may 
follow in instituting an environmental management system. ISO 14001:2004 provides a general 
template for developing an environmental management system for use by all firms. This meets 
the ISO’s organizational goal—to standardize systems, to increase interoperability, to reduce 
the cost of obtaining knowledge, and to assure those that rely on the system that the essential 
elements of environmental management have been considered and addressed. Because the 
operations of businesses differ from one another, their environmental impacts vary. For this 
reason, ISO has provided a general template that may be modified by each business based on 
their initial evaluation of their environmental impacts. See ISO 14000 Essentials, ISO: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/ 
iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/environmental_management/iso_14000_
essentials.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011). 
 149.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 288. 
 150.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 422. 
 151.  Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 7; see also Vogel, 
supra note 31, at 170 (describing norm-shifting and a “herd effect” to the decision to adopt 
voluntary standards); Stephen Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, Can Non-State Global 
Governance be Legitimate?: An Analytical Framework, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 347, 349–50 
(2007) (explaining that social systems provide a basis for understanding what institutional goals 
are worthwhile and justified, what institutional structures are legitimate, and what actions are 
appropriate or inappropriate, and that certain private governance systems may be a source of 
change for existing rules and norms). 
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to incentivize firms at all levels to improve their level of 
environmental performance, but this encourages firms to set their 
initial standards low so that they will be able to demonstrate 
continual improvement over time.152 Furthermore, because 
compliance is costly, firms have an incentive to avoid setting 
prescriptive requirements and specific benchmarks.153 Consequently, 
the employment of environmental management systems may obscure 
the fact that the changes firms are making are minor.154 
4.  Codes of Conduct 
In general, codes of conduct are developed by members of an 
industry to reduce risk in industry operations.155 When the members 
 
 152.  King et al., supra note 142, at 1101. 
 153.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 288–89. Prescriptive requirements might include 
maximum emissions during a set time frame. Procedural requirements, in contrast, might 
include plans to take measurements at set intervals and to report them to firm management 
using specific forms of communication. 
 154.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 422–23. 
 155.  See, e.g., Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423 (discussing the Equator Principles). The 
Equator Principles were developed in 2003 by a number of private banking firms, including 
Citigroup, ABN Amro, and Barclays. History of the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles/38-about/about/17 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The project sets industry-wide social and environmental standards for 
project finance, applying across all industry sectors to projects with capital costs in excess of $10 
million. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). The standards 
are based, in part, on the social and environmental sustainability performance standards 
developed by the International Finance Corporation and on the World Bank’s Environmental, 
Health, and Safety general guidelines. Id. Project developers are required to avoid, reduce, 
mitigate, or provide restitution for the negative impacts of their projects on ecosystems and 
communities. Id. In July 2010 an association was created to govern the institution; the 
organization is comprised of participating financial institutions that are active in public finance 
and have adopted the principles and associates (banking institutions that are not active in public 
finance). The Equator Principles Association, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles/38-about/about/12 (last visited Oct. 8, 
2011). The association obtains input from various steering committees and working groups, 
including three stakeholder engagement working groups comprised of NGOs, industry-based 
groups, and SRI firms. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-the-equator-principles (last visited Oct. 8, 
2011). Signatories are required to report annually on their lending activities. Reporting 
Requirements, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/members-
reporting/reporting-requirements (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). At times, NGOs have raised 
questions about the degree to which signatory banks have enforced the Equator Principles and 
held project developers accountable. See, e.g., WWF Urges Commercial Banks Not to Fund 
Controversial Pipeline, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Nov. 11, 2003), http://wwf.panda.org/ 
wwf_news/press_releases/?9722/WWF-urges-commercial-banks-not-to-fund-controversial-
pipeline. While this code of conduct has extended to lenders, the main risks here are from 
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of an industry share a collective reputation, all industry members are 
exposed to economic harm when one member causes injury.156 Codes 
of conduct encourage industry members to undertake similar 
obligations, thereby reducing the competitive disadvantage faced by 
any one firm that is subject to the regulatory standards of a particular 
jurisdiction or the costs of complying with differing standards in 
multiple jurisdictions. In a voluntary context in which no public 
regulation has been developed, codes of conduct facilitate voluntary 
adoption of industry standards by reducing the competitive risks 
associated with implementing labor and working condition standards, 
paying fair wages or fair prices for commodities, adopting new 
technologies or limits to prevent over-harvesting or environmental 
harms. The more firms that participate in a voluntary regulatory 
program, the less competitive disadvantage any single firm faces from 
incurring the costs associated with complying with that program. 
Similarly, in the context of existing regulation, codes of conduct 
may facilitate standards implementation by reducing leakage. Even 
where regulatory standards have been imposed and are properly 
enforced, compliant firms face a competitive disadvantage from firms 
that flee a jurisdiction to avoid the costs associated with regulation.157 
When production and supply networks cross jurisdictional 
boundaries, it becomes more difficult for governments to enforce 
standards.158 Firms may avoid the costs of compliance by 
subcontracting to other companies, by outsourcing risky behavior to 
companies that do not meet size or jurisdictional thresholds,159 and by 
entering into private contracts that mandate conditions that skirt the 
technical parameters of existing regulations.160 
Codes of conduct are usually funded solely by industry or 
industry trade groups and are developed by industry without input 
from other stakeholders, such as potentially impacted parties, 
regulators, or the general public. Consequently, they may not contain 
prescriptive requirements that would improve environmental or 
social outcomes. In fact, they may not supply effective regulatory 
 
leakage—companies turning to other lenders, such as sovereign wealth funds, that do not 
require these kinds of criteria. 
 156.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423. 
 157.  In a related practice, firms sometimes create subsidiaries outside of the regulating 
jurisdiction and execute a subcontract with that entity to outsource the offending activity. 
Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2034. 
 158.  See Vogel, supra note 31, at 159–60. 
 159.  Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2088. 
 160.  Id. 
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standards at all. Frequently, codes of conduct lack structures for 
implementation or procedures for monitoring and enforcement.161 In 
general, firms have an incentive to enjoy the advantages of the 
appearance of improvement without making any actual effort to 
improve. Unless there are effective monitoring and enforcement 
systems in place to ensure compliance, the regime may be marked by 
significant free-riding; this incentive grows as the number of members 
in the industry group increases.162 
5.  Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems provide a 
number of resources to facilitate implementation of social and 
environmental standards. They train and accredit consultants to 
advise participants in the certification process on program 
requirements and to provide technical assistance to firms in 
implementing management systems. They also market the standards 
and label products, firms, and facilities for consumers to generate 
premium prices that incentivize and reward firms to adopt the 
standards and implement the certification process. 
Table 3 summarizes the challenges that arise at the 
implementation stage, the structures institutions supply to address 
those challenges, and the characteristics needed be effective at that 
stage. 
 
Table 3. Implementation Facilitators   
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 161.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423. 
 162.  Lyon, supra note 3, at 59. 
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D.  Monitoring 
A demand for private governance at the monitoring stage arises 
when governments have failed to create adequate requirements for 
monitoring, when too few funds are allocated to develop the 
infrastructure required for monitoring, and when corruption or other 
factors render monitoring ineffective. An economic model of the 
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deterrence effect of sanctions predicts that parties will comply with 
regulation to the extent that the penalties for noncompliance, when 
multiplied by the risk of getting caught, exceed the benefits from 
cheating.163 In other words, the efforts a firm will make and the funds 
the firm will invest to comply with regulations depend on the risk of 
getting caught cheating, the benefits to be gained from cheating, the 
penalty for cheating, and the benefits of compliance.164 The higher the 
risks and costs of noncompliance and the higher the benefits of 
compliance, the more likely a party is to adhere to the rules. This 
suggests four options to improve compliance with the rules: (1) 
increase the likelihood of detecting cheating, (2) reduce the benefits 
from cheating, (3) increase the sanctions against cheaters, and (4) 
increase the rewards for compliance. Private governance institutions 
have taken all four approaches. The first and second options are 
discussed in this section and the third and fourth options are 
discussed in section E infra. 
Most businesses have focused on option one, increasing the 
likelihood of detecting cheaters either by paying for monitoring, 
providing infrastructure to improve monitoring, or expanding the 
number of monitors. However, cooperatives have employed option 
three, reducing the benefits of cheating by eliminating the principal–
agent problem. 
1.  Contractual Approaches 
Much environmental and labor regulatory compliance may be 
attributed to contractual arrangements between private parties.165 
Equity investors condition their investment of capital, lenders 
 
 163.  JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 128–38 (2005). From an 
economic point of view, firms would comply with regulations when the value to be gained from 
cheating is less than the amount of penalty multiplied by the risk of getting caught out of 
compliance. If the penalty multiplied by the risk of getting caught is greater than the value of 
cheating, then a firm will comply with the regulations. However, if the costs of monitoring are 
high, such as when there are many sources of environmental harm, then monitoring will not 
occur as frequently. If monitoring is done less frequently or less comprehensively, the risk of 
getting caught is low and firms will be incentivized to cheat. 
 164.  See Williams, supra note 79, at 493 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)). This analysis derives from the “logic of 
consequences” used primarily in law, economics, and political science. Sociology would 
interpret compliance activities somewhat differently, from the “logic of appropriateness” where 
compliance activities communicate to shareholders, future investors, lenders, insurers, 
regulators, and the general public a commitment that is inculcated through socialization into a 
shared culture. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 63–64 (describing how the ANIME 
framework can accommodate both the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences). 
 165.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2034. 
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condition their lending,166 and insurance companies condition their 
commitment to insure on the outcome of their due diligence or 
underwriting investigations. In general, investors, acquisition parties, 
lenders, and insurers all identify their risks of loss by performing 
preliminary investigations. As an alternative, or in conjunction with 
these investigations, investors, purchasers, lenders, and insurers may 
also require that the counterparty make representations and 
warranties about past activity and make covenants promising to 
undertake certain beneficial actions and to avoid actions that would 
increase risks during the term of the contract. The counterparty 
discloses in a set of schedules all of the known risks and costs that the 
investors, purchasers, lenders, and insurers identify as areas of 
concern. 
In the context of an acquisition or investment, the risks and costs 
that the acquisition target identifies may be reflected in a lower 
purchase price, in post-closing agreements, in indemnity provisions, 
and in insurance products covering post-closing risks.167 These kinds 
of contractual arrangements enhance efficiency by permitting the 
parties to allocate those burdens to the parties most likely to manage 
those costs most effectively and cheaply.168 They also incentivize firms 
seeking debt or equity investments to reduce sources of risk before 
seeking capital. 
Lenders may include provisions in their loan documents that 
grant the lender private rights of enforcement when environmental 
problems or risks such as labor strikes or work stoppages arise; in 
doing so, lenders add themselves to the number of parties monitoring 
compliance.169 While lenders may have added these provisions to their 
loan agreements primarily to provide lenders with a counterclaim in 
the context of potential regulatory liability,170 lender imposition of a 
 
 166.  Id. at 2051–56. 
 167.  Id. at 2046–47. 
 168.  See id. at 2050. In addition, private dispute resolution mechanisms in the contracts 
permit parties to preserve confidentiality and to avoid costs associated with court delays and 
unreliability. Id. at 2051. 
 169.  Id. at 2053. 
 170.  Following the imposition of liability against a lender for environmental torts under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006), in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 
1990), lenders began to perform more extensive due diligence to remain within the safe harbor 
regulations promulgated by the EPA and to include additional contractual provisions to provide 
additional defenses against liability. William G. Murray, What to Do About the Problem Project, 
SS049 ALI-ABA 121, 135–36 (2011) (outlining the history of lender liability for environmental 
contamination and the subsequent development of guidance by the EPA to allow lenders to 
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Phase I Environmental Report, for example, in the standard 
underwriting process may not only have availed lenders of the safe 
harbor rules and a number of defenses under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),171 but also improved environmental management.172 
Insurers perform due diligence investigations to determine the 
risk profile of the insured. Insurers set rates and identify exclusions 
from coverage based on what they uncover, and they may offer 
incentives, such as lower premiums, for safe operations and actions 
that reduce risk. Insurers may also mandate that the insured employ 
certain equipment or implement certain procedures prior to granting 
coverage. Finally, insurance companies may conduct inspections to 
verify whether the matters a firm has reported are correct. 
2.  Audits and Third Party Assurance Services 
Third-party auditing processes arose initially as an extension of 
the financial audits that accounting firms performed.173 Globalized 
firms now outsource manufacturing processes and other services to 
foreign firms.174 Products have also grown more complex; supply firms 
manufacture components in different countries, making it more 
difficult to monitor and control quality, conformity to specifications, 
and timely delivery.175 Because manufacturing standards, regulatory 
infrastructure, and cultural practices differ throughout the world, 
firms now hire third-party auditors to verify whether goods 
manufactured by foreign contractors meet the contracting firm’s 
specifications.176 
 
avail themselves of safe harbors and employ other defenses under CERCLA by undertaking 
“all appropriate inquiries” including a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment before taking 
title through a foreclosure action). 
 171.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675. 
 172.  Recently Brazil has expanded their rules for environmental liability to include lenders 
in the array of potentially responsible parties in an apparent attempt to use lender due diligence 
and monitoring as a mechanism to enforce environmental laws and to substitute for an 
ineffective public administration regime. See Bianca Zambao, Brazil’s Launch of Lender 
Environmental Liability as a Tool to Manage Environmental Impacts, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L COMP. 
L. REV 47 (2010). 
 173.  Blair et al., supra note 30, at 330. 
 174.  Id. at 329, 335. 
 175.  See id. at 329. 
 176.  Id. Social, cultural, and institutional differences and geographic distance reduce the 
frequency of interaction and information transfers, impacting accuracy of the information flows. 
See King et al., supra note 142, at 1093, 1096. 
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Third-party audits have expanded to include social parameters 
relating to labor standards, environmental impacts, and other 
matters.177 As firms have begun to expand into new markets for 
environmentally friendly or socially responsible goods or services, 
they have begun making claims that they have taken effective actions 
to reduce their negative environmental or social impacts, or that their 
products are better for the environment than comparable products. 
Frequently, in response to environmental NGO accusations that firms 
are misrepresenting their green credentials or greenwashing their 
environmental performance, these firms have begun to employ third-
party audits to prove their environmental claims are true.178 Social 
audits verify whether or not a firm or facility is adhering to pledges it 
has made to follow certain production processes, use certain 
management systems, or otherwise meet the benchmarks or 
environmental or social standards to which it has committed. Social 
audits may be aimed at firm products, facilities, services, or 
processes.179 They may include performance assessments to determine 
whether production standards have been met, or may simply verify 
whether a firm is following prescribed processes.180 Companies may 
hire either private firms, including the accounting firms that are 
performing other auditing services,181 civic organizations,182 or some 
hybrid to perform the audits. Some institutions set guidelines and 
provide training for auditors to ensure that firm performance is 
accurately measured.183 
As auditing has grown into a separate industry,184 private 
commercial auditors have sometimes been criticized as ineffective.185 
Conflicts of interest arise when the party being audited pays for the 
audit.186 Consequently, some private governance institutions require 
 
 177.  Courville, supra note 61, at 272; Blair et al., supra note 30, at 329, 337. 
 178.  Courville, supra note 61, at 271–72 (noting that studies have shown that false 
environmental claims are widespread). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Blair et al., supra note 30, at 345. Major accounting firms are responsible for providing 
sixty percent of the reports where firms seek third-party verification. 
 182.  Courville, supra note 61, at 272. 
 183.  See id. at 276–77. 
 184.  Blair et al., supra note 30, at 342. 
 185.  Michael J. Hiscox et al., Evaluating the Impact of SA 8000 Certification, in SA 8000: 
THE FIRST DECADE 147–48 (Deborah Leipziger ed., 2008). 
 186.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 275 (noting that financial relationships can weaken 
auditor independence). 
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the party closest to the consumer in the supply chain pay for the 
audit.187 In addition, stakeholders question whether monitoring 
agencies are sufficiently independent so as to fairly assess compliance 
when these same monitoring agencies are paid by their regulatory 
targets, are hired to assist with implementation, or are imbedded in 
the organizations that set the standards.188 To maintain legitimacy, a 
number of these institutions have separated the standards-setting and 
implementation activity from the monitoring functions by transferring 
those functions to newly created organizations or business entities.189 
This practice eliminates the potential conflict of interest that may 
arise when monitors also set and improve standards or have business 
interests in standards implementation assistance.190 
Some scholars have suggested that the enforcement of 
environmental and social provisions would be improved through 
widespread adoption of more explicit and effective standards and by 
disclosure of existing implementation and enforcement practices, 
possibly through a clearinghouse relating to supply contracts that 
would include detailed information about firm supplier procurement 
policies, environmental provisions in the contracts, other materials 
about implementation, and the extent of enforcement by the supply 
chain anchor or retailer.191 These changes would expand the number 
of monitors by permitting consumers and NGOs to evaluate firm and 
supply chain performance.192 However, firms are unlikely to 
voluntarily share such information because it would reduce their 
competitiveness generally. 
3.  Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems 
In general, consumers concerned with the environmental impacts 
of goods they consider buying can seldom discern whether the goods 
were produced sustainably and without use of toxins just by 
 
 187.  For example, the Fairtrade Labeling Organization solves this problem in a unique way 
by charging the final packaging company in the supply chain a license fee to pay for the cost of 
the auditing process. Id. This allocates the audit costs to the entity in the supply chain that is 
closest to the consumer—the party that most values the audit. While the actual cost of the audit 
may ultimately be passed forward or backward (through higher coffee prices to consumers or 
reduced prices for farmers) based on market dynamics, it solves the conflict of interest 
dilemmas that arise from producers paying directly for their own audits. 
 188.  Id. at 283. 
 189.  Id. at 287–88. 
 190.  Id. at 283. 
 191.  Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 967. 
 192.  See id. at 969. 
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examining the goods. Similarly, consumers concerned about the social 
conditions under which goods were manufactured or produced cannot 
tell through inspection whether the goods were produced under 
hazardous or unfair working conditions, traded under monopolistic 
terms, or extracted at the cost of human life.193 When a consumer 
cannot discern the quality of the good before, during, or after use, 
those goods are known as “credence goods.”194 Consumer criteria 
relating to environmental sustainability and social impacts are 
credence qualities.195 Credence goods create monitoring and selection 
problems. 196 
Because the goods are credence goods, consumers and investors 
have difficulty identifying the goods that meet their preferences. In 
these situations investors and consumers must generally rely on the 
reputation or assurances of other parties.197 SRI firms screen 
investments to meet investor standards. Voluntary standards, 
certification, and labeling systems create structures to ensure that a 
firm, facility, or set of goods complies with and conforms to their 
standards.198 These systems solve the monitoring problem by training 
and accrediting monitors and by requiring all products, facilities, or 
firms that receive the certification label to go through a process in 
which their activities are monitored to ensure that they conform to 
the standards. To the extent monitors fail to apply standards 
uniformly, they are subject to negative reputational costs and may be 
subject to having their accreditation revoked. Voluntary standards, 
certification, and labeling systems assist consumers in differentiating 
and selecting compliant goods by labeling them.199 
 
 193.  Whether or not resources have been extracted as a result of exploitative practices or a 
product has been manufactured using slave labor, and whether these items are transferred up 
the supply chain for less than their fair market value because of the exercise of power, is not 
visible to the consumer. 
 194.  Darby & Karni, supra note 87, at 68–69 (“Credence qualities are those which, although 
worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead the assessment of their value requires 
additional costly information.”). 
 195.  Ostensibly, consumers with concerns about the presence of toxins may detect them 
through chemical testing processes, but such tests can be exorbitantly expensive and are not 
readily available. 
 196.  King et al., supra note 142, at 1092. 
 197.  See Darby & Karni, supra note 87, at 69 (discussing the issue in the context of repair 
services, where consumers often must rely on the claims of the service provider). 
 198.  See Vogel, supra note 31, at 183. 
 199.  For example, the Forest Stewardship Council certifies and labels forest products so 
that consumers may avoid illegally and unsustainably harvested wood and instead choose 
products that have been sustainably harvested. Similarly, the Marine Stewardship Council, 
through their certification and labeling of fish and marine products, seeks to increase consumer 
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4.  Disclosure and Reporting Initiatives 
Disclosure and reporting initiatives increase the risks to 
noncompliant firms of getting caught by expanding the number of 
monitors. They recruit firms to self-report information about their 
activities across a range of social and environmental parameters.200 
Reporting initiatives multiply the effects of both governmental 
regulation and private governance by increasing the number of 
monitors and by rewarding firms with positive recognition and 
reputational benefits for reducing the negative impacts of the 
manufacture and distribution processes.201 Reporting initiatives also 
shift public norms, including management norms,202 facilitate 
environmental activism,203 and signal investment choices for socially 
responsible investors and underwriting choices for insurance 
companies.204 By providing more information about whether firms are 
 
awareness about illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and shift consumption toward 
more sustainable harvesting. 
 200.  The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is one of the most well-known of these types of 
programs. CERES, a nonprofit organization created following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
partnered with the United Nations Environmental Programme to develop a corporate code of 
conduct–the CERES principles–to be used by private investors in evaluating firm performance. 
These principles and their reporting requirements later developed into the GRI. Pattberg, supra 
note 138, at 598–602. The GRI is a network-based organization that has developed a 
sustainability reporting framework that reduces the transaction costs firms face in gathering and 
reporting information relating to the environmental and social impacts of their operations. The 
framework helps firms determine what to report and how to gather reliable, high-quality data 
about their operations, and facilitates the compilation of credible, consistent reports that permit 
investors to compare firms. See generally GRI, http://www.globalreporting.org/Home (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2011). 
 201.  See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
905, 943 (2008). 
 202.  Vogel, supra note 34, at 269 (“The literature . . . frequently claims that business 
acceptance of [corporate social responsibility] in general and civil regulation in particular both 
reflect and reinforce a shift in norms for acceptable global business behavior.”); see also 
Pattberg, supra note 46, at 598–602 (describing development of the GRI as arising, in part, from 
demands of investors seeking information about risks associated with companies’ environmental 
performance and the subsequent responsiveness of firms in participating in the GRI to secure 
brand reputation and profits amidst a hostile public environment following the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill). 
 203.  See id. at 955. 
 204.  See id. at 956. Formal government has also employed periodic reporting and 
transparency requirements to facilitate surveillance by multiple parties, including the general 
public. Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2072. Mandatory public disclosure requirements—such 
as those in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929–6939 
(2006), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
11021–11023 (2006), and the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 13106 (2006), which 
are reported in the Toxic Release Inventory—have been effective in shifting firms to reduce 
their environmental impacts. The Toxic Release Inventory, established shortly after the 1984 
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performing across a range of environmental and social parameters, 
disclosure and reporting initiatives educate the public about risks, 
permit investors to make socially conscious decisions about their 
investments, permit consumers to make thoughtful choices about 
their purchases, and permit regulators, insurance companies, and 
other interested parties to compare risks between firms. 
Monitoring the supply of credence goods is inherently 
problematic. Where voluntary standards, certification, and labeling 
systems face difficulties in verifying that goods are legally harvested, 
organic, traded fairly, produced in a sustainable, ecosystem-friendly 
manner, investors face similar difficulties in discerning whether their 
investments are supporting their investment goals. Consequently, to 
the extent that any of these private governance institutions rely on 
self-reported information from firms without employing a monitoring 
or verification system, private governance institutions have no way to 
tell whether the reports are accurate. However, by affirmatively 
reporting firm activities, practices, and other performance metrics, 
firms invite additional scrutiny by employees, investors, consumers, 
concerned public interest groups, the news media, and the markets. 
Economic modeling suggests that firm participation in reporting 
initiatives will be low compared to participation under mandatory 
government disclosure programs, particularly among the firms that 
perform most poorly along the reported parameters.205 However, 
when compared to situations in which there is no clear governing 
authority and where government has failed to act, any movement by 
firms to address social costs can improve outcomes, particularly when 
the risks associated with inaction are high.206 In addition, movement 
 
Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal India, has been seen as particularly effective. It requires large 
industrial firms to disclose information to the public each year about chemical releases that have 
occurred at their facilities. Vandenbergh, supra note 201, at 943–44. Empirical studies have 
shown that markets have responded to this information by penalizing the highest emitters with 
reductions in stock value. Id. As a consequence, high-emitting firms reduced their emissions 
more rapidly and to a greater extent than lower-emitting companies, even when emissions 
reductions were not required by law. Id. 
 205.  Lyon, supra note 3, at 61 (discussing incentives for firm to disclose or to avoid 
disclosure). 
 206.  For instance, in response to the risks associated with climate change, nearly 3000 of the 
largest corporations submitted voluntary reports in 2009 on their carbon emissions to the 
Carbon Disclosure Project, which provides the information to over 500 institutional investors, 
with over $71 trillion in assets under management, and approximately 60 supply chain anchors, 
such as Wal-Mart. What We Do: Overview, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, 
https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
The data is also available to policymakers, government bodies, NGOs, universities, and the 
general public. The Carbon Disclosure Project was developed to identify the financial risks 
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toward disclosure by a few firms could eventually lead to the 
development of industry-wide codes of conduct that would shift 
adoption and implementation rates upward. 
5.  Environmental Management Systems 
Firms employing environmental management systems generally 
use internal control systems to monitor firm performance.207 These 
firms may supplement internal audits with external auditing, 
disclosure, and reporting programs.208 Environmental management 
systems also generally provide a framework for generating 
documentation to demonstrate compliance. To the extent that a firm 
discloses this information to the public, the report may be used to 
provide assurance to employees, customers, and the general public 
about risk, safety, and environmental performance, to confirm with 
investors, lenders, and suppliers that the firm is operating in 
conformity with their requirements, and to show regulatory agencies 
that the firm is in compliance with the law. Environmental 
management systems may therefore reduce the frequency and costs of 
external monitoring by government regulators.209 To the extent that 
 
companies face from climate change and companies’ efforts to decrease carbon emissions, with 
the understanding that in the business world “what gets measured gets managed.” Blair et al., 
supra note 30, at 345; Industry Viewpoints: What Does Business Want from a Global Deal?, 
CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/en-us/WhatWeDo/Pages/Industry-
viewpoints-What-does-business-want-from-a-Global-Deal.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
Nevertheless, if reporting initiatives only require firms to self-report and lack systems to verify 
whether the reports correctly reflect the firm environmental impacts, their usefulness to 
investors and consumers may be limited. 
 207.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 288. 
 208.  Id. In addition to mandatory governmental programs and due diligence and 
compliance information requests by contracting parties, firms may report their data to 
disclosure and reporting initiatives such as The Global Reporting Initiative or the Carbon 
Disclosure Project. See What is GRI?, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, 
http://www.globalreporting.org/ AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); What We Do, 
CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/ 
overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2011). 
 209.  Courville, supra note 61, at 288–89 (“As one of the expectation gaps in social auditing 
is the inability of the external auditor and certification system to constantly monitor 
performance of the producer company, internal control systems or management systems can 
provide a critical tool of more regular monitoring of performance. This is then complemented 
by periodic planned and surprise checks by external auditors. However, where internal auditing 
is used as a vehicle to reduce the external audit to less than 100 percent coverage, the difficulty 
is in finding the right balance between internal and external auditing, balancing capacity 
building, and ownership with inspectability to a consistent interpretation of the standards.”). 
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internal auditing is used to reduce the comprehensiveness of an 
external audit, however, the value of the auditing process declines.210 
6.  Cooperatives 
In contrast to the mechanisms outlined above, which improve 
compliance by expanding monitoring, cooperatives reduce the 
benefits a firm might receive from cheating. Cooperatives form when 
groups of individuals or firms voluntarily decide to work together to 
meet their collective needs or to share the profits from their 
enterprise.211 Cooperatives are mutual benefit organizations; those 
who use the enterprise control it, and control rights are exercised on a 
one-person, one-vote basis.212 
Cooperatives may take the form of business organizations that 
are owned by employees in equal shares, such as trade cooperatives,213 
or organizations that are owned by the individuals that actually use its 
services, such as electrical utility cooperatives.214 While competition in 
 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Morris Altman, History and Theories of Cooperatives, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 563 (Helmut K. Anheir et al. eds., 2010). There are nearly 
30,000 cooperatives in the U.S., owning more than $3 trillion in assets. They generate over $500 
billion in revenue and $25 billion in wages. UNIV. OF WISCONSIN CTR. FOR COOPS., RESEARCH 
ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COOPERATIVES 2 (2009), available at 
http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/sites/all/REIC_FINAL.pdf. They are not prominent in the scholarly 
literature, however. Some scholars attribute this to a decline in coverage of institutions in 
economics textbooks which has shifted toward neoclassical economics, and the changing role of 
the economist as a social engineer that seeks optimal solutions. Panu Kalmi, The Disappearance 
of Co-operatives from Economic Textbooks, 31 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 625, 639 (2007). 
 212.  See Kalmi, supra note 211, at 627. 
 213.  For example, fair trade certification and labeling programs often have a cooperative 
element. Farmers that participate in the Fairtrade Labeling Organization are required to 
participate in cooperatives designed to assist producers in developing and accessing new 
markets and in building trading relationships. See Courville, supra note 61, at 279. The fair trade 
premium garnered by the program is delivered to the cooperative and the cooperative members, 
a joint body of workers and management, to decide how it is to be used. Id. at 280. They may 
elect to remit the proceeds to the cooperative members or to use the money to make other 
investments that will allow the group to enhance their operations and improve their 
profitability. See id. at 281. Cooperatives also often seek to achieve social goals as well as serve 
their members’ needs, such as promoting equality, recognizing human rights, and protecting the 
environment. Kalmi, supra note 211, at 627. 
 214.  During the Great Depression the extension of public utility services was seen to be a 
key factor in reducing poverty and improving employment and interstate trade. Because the 
costs of extending electricity to rural areas would likely exceed the benefits for many years, few 
local and state governments were willing to make these investments. The Rural Electrification 
Administration was created under the New Deal to make loans to rural electrification 
cooperatives so that they could build lines and other infrastructure to transmit electricity to 
rural residents. Exec. Order No. 7037 (May 11, 1935). 
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a free market with full information and low transaction costs would 
theoretically produce the greatest social welfare for both buyers and 
purchasers,215 exercises of market power, hold-up problems, lack of 
easy access to complete information, principal–agent problems, moral 
hazard, and uncertainty may inhibit trade.216 Cooperatives address 
problems associated with unfair competition and monopolistic use of 
power either upstream or downstream217 by permitting individuals to 
act collectively to obtain discounts and other benefits granted to 
market actors that engage in larger and more regular transactions.218 
Cooperatives use vertical integration to address problems of hold-
up,219 which may occur in processing agricultural or other products 
requiring time-sensitive processing or delivery.220 By purchasing and 
managing the processing equipment or delivery mechanism, 
cooperative members eliminate the parties in the supply chain that 
may reduce the value of their goods by delay and force them to 
relinquish price premiums for those goods.221 While vertical 
integration through merger is also possible, the cooperative form 
permits decentralized decision-making and allows firms to capitalize 
on time-based or location-specific knowledge.222 Cooperative 
 
 215.  See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase 
theorizes that, with perfect information and in the absence of transaction costs, trade will give 
rise to an economically efficient allocation of entitlements, regardless of how the entitlements 
are originally allocated. If there is no cost associated with making an exchange, parties will 
exchange entitlements until a Pareto optimal allocation occurs; trade will continue to occur until 
no one can be made better off without making another party worse off. 
 216.  GRUBER, supra note 163, at 126–28. 
 217.  Michael Sykuta & Michael L. Cook, A New Institutional Economics Approach to 
Contracts and Cooperatives, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1273, 1276 (2001). 
 218.  Altman, supra note 211, at 564–65. 
 219.  The problem of hold-up occurs when two parties agree to cooperate to make a profit 
and one party makes a significant investment in an asset whose use, economic productivity, and 
therefore value, will depend on the cooperation of the other party. The first party’s sunk costs in 
the asset put him at a disadvantage and gives the other party significant bargaining power. After 
the first party makes the investment, the second party could demand a significantly higher 
proportion of the profits—a change the first party will be forced to accept or otherwise face the 
loss of his initial investment altogether. 
 220.  Helmut M. Dietl & Martin Grossman, The Knowledge Economics of Cooperatives 
(2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017844. 
For example, dairy farmers that need to get milk to market face hold-up problems from 
distributors to whom they sell the milk. Failure to get the milk to market in time will cause it to 
spoil. By creating their own cooperative distribution system, farmers eliminate the principal–
agent problem and the incentive to hold-up. 
 221.  See id. at 16 (discussing vertically integrated dairy cooperatives as a manner by which 
producers can avoid the hold-up problem). 
 222.  Id. When general knowledge is more important, vertical integration through merger 
solves the hold-up problem and the centralized decision-making that results from merger will 
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structures, therefore, also permit individuals or entities that otherwise 
compete with each other to coordinate successfully without reducing 
their incentives to compete or make decisions independently.223 In the 
context of the theory of the firm,224 the decision to make (yielding 
protection from opportunistic behavior at the expense of additional 
coordination costs from centralized decision-making)225 or buy, if 
opportunistic behavior and hold-out are less likely or less costly and 
external transaction costs are relatively low, is expanded to include a 
third option: cooperate. 
 
not create additional inefficiencies. Id. When specific knowledge is needed, however, the 
centralized decision-making may not allow the company to capitalize on time- or location-
specific knowledge of the merged entities. See generally Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of 
Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945) (“If we can agree that the economic 
problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances 
of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people 
who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the 
resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be 
solved by first communicating all this knowledge to the central board which, after integrating all 
knowledge, issues its orders. . . . We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that 
the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.”). If 
decentralized decision-making processes remain in place to accommodate and allow the 
company to benefit from idiosyncratic knowledge, the company will need to spend additional 
resources to communicate and coordinate among the segments of the merged entity. 
 223.  See, e.g., Dietl & Grossman, supra note 220, at 16–17. Most professional sports leagues 
are organized as cooperatives. Individual sports teams would lose much of their value if they did 
not use common rules, referees, scheduling, and marketing. Id. at 17. As Dietl and Grossman 
note, refusal by any team to play according to common rules and schedules (an example of the 
hold-up problem) would undermine the entire league. Id. However, they state that the common 
market solution to hold-up problems—vertical integration through merger—would also 
undermine league value, because fans could no longer trust that the individual teams were 
sufficiently independent for real competition to occur. Id. Cooperative organization permits the 
teams to maintain decentralized decision-making while participating in a binding structure that 
eliminates the uncertainty associated with hold-up. Id. at 17 
 224.  Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (hypothesizing that 
firms begin to organize production inside a firm when the costs associated with that production 
are lower than the transaction costs of bargaining to purchase goods from outside of the firm, 
under knowledge constraints). 
 225.  Peter G. Klein, The Make-or-Buy Decisions: Lessons from Empirical Studies, in 
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 436 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 
2005) (“In the Coasian framework, the decision to organize transactions within the firm as 
opposed to on the open market—the “make or buy” decision—depends on the relative costs of 
internal versus external exchange. The market mechanism entails certain costs: discovering the 
relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and so on. Within the firm, the 
entrepreneur may be able to reduce these ‘transaction costs’ by coordinating these activities 
himself. However, internal organization brings other kinds of transaction costs, namely 
problems of information flow, incentives, monitoring and performance evaluation. The 
boundary of the firm, then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the margin, between the relative 
transaction costs of external and internal exchange.”) 
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Cooperatives also address agency problems.226 When an 
individual hires an agent to conduct business or enter into a 
transaction on the individual’s behalf, a number of problems may 
arise. First, the agent may have a conflict of interest: the principal 
may not be able to tell whether the agent is serving the interests of 
the principal or pursuing the agent’s own interests—a “moral hazard” 
problem.227 Second, the agent may withhold information that the 
principal would otherwise use to negotiate a fair price with the agent 
if the principal had access to the information.228 Two ways that market 
participants use contract law to solve the asymmetrical information 
problem are to perform research before the transaction or to monitor 
and enforce rules after the transaction.229 Both of these solutions can 
be expensive. Cooperatives eliminate the agency and asymmetrical 
information problems by allowing a market actor (such as the 
consumer) to be involved on both sides of the transaction.230 
Additional profits to be gained from an agent succumbing to moral 
hazard or using asymmetrical information to the detriment of the 
person who hired them will accrue as a surplus not to the agent, but 
to the cooperative as a whole.231 Surpluses are then distributed to 
cooperative members in accordance with their relative contribution to 
that surplus.232 The cooperative structure changes the incentives; if 
consumers ultimately reap the profits from withholding information, 
there is little reason for agents to withhold the information from 
consumers in the first place.233 In times of legislative gridlock and 
 
 226.  Sykuta & Cook, supra note 217, at 1274. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at 1276. 
 229.  Id. at 1277. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Altman, supra note 211, at 538. In this hypothetical the individual would likely receive 
a percentage of the surplus equivalent to the amount of his investment. 
 232.  A trade cooperative rewards its members according to the members’ relative 
production, a work cooperative according to the members’ labor, and a purchasing cooperative 
according to the members’ patronage. 
 233.  Sykuta & Cook, supra note 217, at 1279. Ultimately, the problem of monitoring 
managers is addressed by internalizing the monitoring within the firm structure. Armen Alchian 
& Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 777, 777–78 (1972). While an employee may act adversely to both the customer’s interest 
and the employer’s interest, employee activities are more readily and regularly monitored, self-
interested actions are more easily detected, and their activities are less likely to cause as 
extensive or widespread harm. As an empirical matter, regulation permits investor-owned firms 
to proliferate where there would otherwise be significant problems with asymmetric 
information, such as in the banking and insurance industries. HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
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limited administrative budgets, it is therefore not surprising that 
communities are turning again to cooperative structures to address 
their own banking, consumer, and employment needs.234 
Table 4 identifies the challenges that arise at the monitoring 
stage, the private governance institutions that address those 
challenges, what they supply, and the characteristics the institutions 
must have to be effective. 
 
Table 4. Monitoring Institutions 
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OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 294 (1996). Where regulation has been ineffective, however, 
cooperative ownership is an obvious response. 
 234.  See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Amid Wall Street Protests, Smaller Banks Gain Favor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at B5 (describing the shift to community banks, credit unions and banking 
cooperatives to avoid new fees charged by larger banking institutions and to support investment 
in local communities); Lee Romney, They’re Owning This Cooperation, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 28, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/28/local/la-me-richmond-20111128 (describing the 
resurgence of cooperatives during the recession and efforts by cities such as Cleveland, Ohio; 
Washington, D.C.; Amarillo, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; and Richmond, Virginia to develop or 
partner with cooperatives to increase employment and reduce poverty); Stuart Pfeifer & E. 
Scott Reckard, One Facebook Post Becomes National Movement to Abandon Big Banks, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/04/business/la-fi-bank-transfer-
20111105 (describing the impetus behind Bank Transfer Day). 
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E.  Enforcement Institutions 
As mentioned above, institutions may improve compliance with 
rules by improving monitoring systems that increase the likelihood 
that cheaters will be caught, by reducing the benefits of cheating, by 
posing a credible threat of sanctions, and by increasing the penalties 
of getting caught. This section discusses the innovative mechanisms 
that private governance institutions have developed to pursue the 
latter two strategies, including increasing the number of parties with 
the power to enforce the rules, the benefits associated with 
compliance, and the costs of noncompliance. 
Roberts_FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/5/2012  6:03 PM 
118 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 22:67 
1.  Regulation by Contract 
Firms have employed a number of contract mechanisms to 
incentivize regulatory compliance from firms.235 Acquisition and 
equity investors manage concerns about risk by refusing to contract, 
negotiating lower purchase prices, shifting risk to the target 
companies and their owners through indemnities and insurance 
requirements, and requiring risk reduction and remediation efforts as 
a funding contingency. They reward firms with lower risk profiles 
with higher investments, higher purchase prices, more favorable deal 
terms, and promises of additional contracts. 
Similarly, following underwriting investigations, lenders may 
refuse to lend, or they may include additional provisions in loan 
agreements and ancillary documents that provide for continued 
oversight, expanded default triggers, and contingencies for funding. 
The additional rights that lenders may exercise if firms fail to comply, 
such as declaring default, accelerating the repayment of the loan, and 
controlling the use of loan proceeds, make the threat of sanctions 
more immediate and credible.236 Note that the goal of these 
contractual provisions may simply be to give the lender a defense 
when there is a threat of tort liability or a competing claim on the use 
of loan proceeds if regulatory fines are imposed or remediation 
efforts are required.237 Insurance premium rate structures also 
promote compliance, since insurance companies may inspect insured 
parties to monitor their behavior and offer reductions in premiums if 
firms remain compliant over time.238 If inspections reveal that the 
insured party has misrepresented risk or broken covenants, the 
insurer may also deny coverage. On the other hand, lenders may 
reward compliant borrowers with lower rates, better terms, and 
additional loans. 
Supply chain anchors use third party assurance services to verify 
compliance with quality control standards. They punish 
noncompliance by withholding payments and terminating contracts, 
 
 235.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 38, at 2044. 
 236.  Id. at 2055. Lenders with private rights of enforcement sometimes create more 
stringent standards. Id. at 2055–56. 
 237.  Id. at 2052. Following the Fleet Factors case and the EPA’s development of certain safe 
harbors that lenders may use to avoid liability for environmental torts, lenders may use these 
kinds of provisions primarily for defensive purposes. In the event that the borrower is subject to 
damages, fees, or fines as a result of tort liability or noncompliance, the lender retains the right 
to control loan proceeds and may prevent them from being used to pay those liabilities or to 
redress environmental impacts. 
 238.  See id. at 2063. 
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and they reward compliant suppliers with continued future contracts 
and more favorable prices or terms. 
2.  Education and Mobilization Initiatives 
Civic organizations investigate firm activities and sometimes 
employ name and shame tactics that alert the public by identifying 
firms responsible for environmental or social harms or by exposing 
false claims of environmental or social responsibility. They enforce 
public regulation and private governance regimes with threats of 
boycotts, negative news media reports, the potential loss of market 
share and investors, and the costs associated with new regulation. 
When combined with the desire of firm owners, managers, and 
employees to maintain an image of public integrity, these mechanisms 
provide credible sanctions that pressure firms to reduce risk, 
remediate adverse impacts, and keep their practices in alignment with 
their claims and societal norms.239 Firms that can demonstrate they 
meet or exceed the standards set by societal norms can also receive 
positive attention and increased investment.240 
3.  Conservation Land Trusts 
Land conservancies, or conservation land trusts, are nonprofit 
organizations that acquire rights to ecologically, environmentally, or 
historically important properties.241 Land conservancies are commonly 
developed to preserve open space, ranchland, farmland, 
environmentally sensitive areas, water rights, and riparian zones.242 
These institutions pose an innovative solution to enforcement 
problems by expanding the number of parties with property interests 
and legal standing to enforce contractual rights. They may acquire 
property in fee, obtain conservation easement rights, or purchase the 
development or resource extraction rights associated with the 
property.243 Sometimes land conservancies transfer the acquired rights 
to federal or state governments for management and enforcement, 
especially if the acquired rights are to lands adjacent to other publicly 
held lands. But land conservancies may also hold the property rights 
 
 239.  See Livermore, supra note 97, at 330–31 (describing how reputational forces can 
motivate firms to avoid harmful environmental practices). 
 240.  See id. at 331. 
 241.  Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty, The Promise and 
Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (2010). 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
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in perpetuity, privately enforcing the land use restrictions in 
conservation easements to prevent heirs from developing property 
subject to the easement.244 Policymakers are increasingly considering 
conservancies not only for managing ecologically sensitive and 
historically important lands, but for preserving the relationships with 
indigenous people who rely on those lands.245 
4.  Voluntary Standards, Certification, and Labeling Systems 
While other institutions enhance enforcement by increasing 
sanctions or deter capture by expanding the number of enforcement 
parties, voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems use 
markets to incentivize compliance. In general, voluntary standards, 
certification, and labeling institutions market labeled goods and 
facilities to the public so that they may offer firms positive 
reputational benefits or retail price premiums to incentivize adoption 
of the standards and implementation of the certification program.246 
By using a label to justify higher prices and generate goodwill, the 
systems reduce the relative benefits of non-adoption. To the extent 
that the programs determine that member firms have not continued 
to conform to the certification standards, they may discipline the 
firms through fines or other penalties and may ultimately bar the 
firms from using the system’s label. 
Note that unfair or unequal enforcement poses a challenge for 
the institution. When participants allege that the enforcement 
 
 244.  One example of a well-recognized land conservation trust is The Nature Conservancy. 
The organization works throughout the United States and in thirty-one other countries to 
identify and preserve the ecological resources that they identify as most important, including 
forest, marine, and freshwater resources. The organization’s conservation work includes 
obtaining property rights and transferring them to state and federal governments for 
management, acquiring conservation easements over private properties, managing its own 
private nature preserves, performing conservation services, and improving management 
practices for millions of acres of land and water. See generally THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.nature.org (last visited Jan. 19, 2012). In 2009, the Nature Conservancy had $4.6 
billion in assets and an annual operating budget of $448 million. It received over $400 million in 
member dues and donations and over $300 million in land sales and gifts that year. THE 
NATURE CONSERVANCY, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT (2009), available at http://www.nature.org/ 
aboutus/ouraccountability/annualreport/Annual-Report-2009.xml?src=araboutus. 
 245.  See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood & Zachary Welcker, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part I): 
The Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 373 
(2008); Mary Christina Wood & Matthew O’Brien, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part II): 
Evaluating Four Models of Tribal Participation in The Conservation Trust Movement, 27 STAN. 
ENVTL L. REV. 477 (2008); Karol Bourdreaux, A New Call of the Wild: Community-Based 
Resource Management in Namibia, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (2008). 
 246.  Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 186–87. 
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processes are being applied unfairly or unequally, the system can 
undergo a loss of credibility and legitimacy.247 This may result in 
increased cheating by the participants248 and potentially withdrawal 
from the private governance scheme.249 One of the key distinctions 
between private governance and formal government is that state 
criminal and civil sanction are available to keep residents from 
refusing to comply with the law and from opting out when formal 
government is engaged.250 In contrast, private governance institutions 
are maintained through the continuing agreement of their 
participants and are more sensitive to disputes and opt-outs, which 
can destabilize the regime. Voluntary standards, certification, and 
labeling mechanisms avoid this problem by supplying conflict 
resolution mechanisms that allow participants to resolve their 
disputes cheaply and quickly.251 By requiring participation in dispute 
resolution procedures, private governance institutions allow 
participants to air grievances and resolve conflicts. Dispute resolution 
mechanisms improve the likelihood of long-term success by reducing 
their members’ need for and their opportunity to resort to exit.252 
Private governance institutions that include dispute resolution 
mechanisms tend to be more stable and robust in the face of 
challenges as well as resilient to external changes that occur over 
time.253 
Independent of the market incentives to encourage participation 
by producers and the enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms 
aimed at sustaining their participation, voluntary standards, 
certification, and labeling systems also encourage continued 
participation among consumers. Sociological literature suggests that 
individuals are thought to take action based on the logic of 
appropriateness rather than the result of a conscious cost-benefit 
 
 247.  Courville, supra note 61, at 290. 
 248.  Id. at 290. 
 249.  Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 186–87. 
 250.  Id. at 184. 
 251.  UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 267–68 (noting that 
(1) all rules are subject to interpretation, (2) conflicts arise between participants even when they 
have made the rules jointly, (3) low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms not only address 
immediate conflicts, but reduce conflicts as the community becomes aware of the way the 
conflicts have been resolved and the rules have been interpreted, and (4) such mechanisms also 
deter capture by local elites). 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
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analysis.254 Institutions are viewed as social practices as individuals’ 
identities are shaped by their membership in groups, and they comply 
with rules as a matter of habit.255 To the extent that a community’s 
belief systems, norms, culture, and sense of connectedness create a 
culture of compliance, it reduces the need to develop complex 
systems for monitoring and enforcement and reduces the costs of 
enforcement.256 On the other hand, if the parties participating in the 
governance system share no common norms or share norms of 
noncompliance, the costs associated with enforcing the regime will be 
higher.257 Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling mechanisms 
have often been developed by groups with a shared set of values258 or 
a common mission.259 In turn, the groups have used their networks to 
expand the market for certified goods, providing an avenue for group 
 
 254.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 63, 70; Young, Governance for Sustainable 
Development, supra note 56, at 31; see also Lemos & Agrawal, supra note 9, at 76 (describing an 
emerging literature focusing on popularity, responsiveness, legitimacy, transparency, and 
accountability in the context of private governance). 
 255.  See id. 
 256.  Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 7 (contrasting the 
collective action perspective with the social practices perspective). The collective action 
perspective “assumes that individuals have preferences that are exogenous to their membership 
in groups, that they act on the basis of some sort of utilitarian calculation, and that they 
endeavor to maximize payoffs to themselves as individuals. Institutions form through a 
process—explicit or implicit—of developing social contracts. The prisoner’s dilemma, the free-
rider problem, and more generally problems of burden sharing and compliance loom as critical 
concerns among collective-action thinkers. The social practices perspective, by contrast, 
assumes that the identities of individuals are shaped in part by group membership, that actors 
are influenced by what is known as the logic of appropriateness as opposed to the logic of 
consequences, and that compliance with institutional rights and rules often become a matter of 
second nature or habit.” Id. See also Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, 
Reciprocity, and Reputation, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM 
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 19, 26, 33–34, 42–43, 48–49 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 
2003) (discussing the lack of empirical support for predictions of behavior in less structured 
situations than situations where the stakes are high and the numbers are low, such as 
competitive market situations (p. 26), and discussing the positive impacts of in-person 
communication (pp. 33–34) and reciprocity norms (pp. 42–43) on cooperation, and the positive 
feedback loop between reciprocity norms, reputation for trustworthiness, and levels of trust (pp. 
48–49)). 
 257.  See Young, Institutions and Environmental Change, supra note 56, at 15; see also 
Livermore, supra note 97, at 333. 
 258.  Fair trade labeling activities were initially instituted by church groups and spread 
through support of church networks, for example. 
 259.  The Forest Stewardship Council was developed from an alliance between World Wide 
Fund for Nature and a number of British firms following the breakdown of efforts to negotiate a 
forestry treaty at the Rio Summit in 1992. About Us, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, 
http://www.fscus.org/about_us (last visited Oct. 7, 2011); Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 182. 
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and network members to express their values and mission through 
their consumption choices.260 
Furthermore, under post-structuralist theory, political scientists 
see individuals as shaped by the ways that governments exercise 
power.261 Governments are thought to achieve their ends less by 
forcing people to comply with state-mandated goals than by making 
them allies and confederates.262 The mere existence of a known rule 
may influence behavior.263 In a coordination game, knowledge of the 
law may change behavior, even without the threat of sanctions.264 
Similarly, the opportunity for citizens to make consumer choices 
based on labels invites consumers to see themselves as citizen–
consumers, and enables them to take action through their 
consumption choices and purchasing power.265 To the extent 
consumers use self-restraint in their consumption, they have 
internalized the enforcement process. 
Table 5 identifies the challenges that arise at the enforcement 
stage, the private governance institutions that address those 








 260.  Kysar, supra note 113, at 624–25; Cashore et al., supra note 17, at 181. 
 261.  Lemos & Agrawal, supra note 9, at 84–86 (noting that an individual’s understanding 
and governance of themselves are shaped through scientific inquiries that identify them and 
their behaviors as targets of inquiry, through disciplinary practices that make distinctions 
between types of individuals, and through modes of thought that make certain practices seem 
more reasonable than others). 
 262.  Id. at 84–85. These theories suggested that individuals’ private lives and actions are 
also shaped by the way that knowledge is represented. In the process of following certain modes 
of thought, or “discourses,” and engaging in certain practices, individuals posit themselves as 
subjects and take actions consistent with that subjectivity. When the dominant discourse 
changes, institutional change occurs. This line of inquiry is thought to be relevant particularly 
for market-based forms of governance that posit individuals as global citizens and consumers, 
those that label goods for consumption and for socially responsible investment, and the kinds of 
programs that shape the information reported by firms along with their investment parameters. 
 263.  See Williams, supra note 79, at 494 (citing Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, 
Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: Expressive Influence in an Experimental 
Hawk/Dove Game 2 (2003) (Northwestern Law Legal Working Paper Series, Law and 
Economics Papers Working Paper no. 29), available at http://law.bepress.com/nwwps/lep/art29). 
 264.  See id. at 482. 
 265.  Kysar, supra note 113, at 624–25. 
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Table 5. Enforcement 
 
Barrier or Hazard Suppliers Structure Supplied Keys to Effectiveness 












mechanisms for breach 
and default, nonpayment 
and reduced payment, 
termination of contract 
Complementary 
monitoring devices 
and credible threat of 
enforcement  
 
Incentives to cheat Insurance 
contracts 
Refusal to insure after 
underwriting, refusal to 
pay claims, offer of 








and credible threat of 
enforcement  
 
Incentives to cheat Lending 
contracts 
Refusal to loan after 
underwriting; loan 
enforcement mechanisms: 
stop payment, default 
interest rates, fines, 
acceleration of debt; 
decision-making rights of 
use of loan proceeds; calls 
on collateral and cross-
collateralized debt 
 
Due diligence review, 
complementary 
monitoring devices, 
and credible threat of 
enforcement  
 
Incentives to cheat Equity 
investment 
contracts 
Refusal to contract 
following due diligence 
review, enforcement of 
indemnification 
agreements, calls on 
private collateral 
 
Due diligence review, 
complementary 
monitoring devices, 
and credible threat of 
enforcement  
 
Incentives to cheat Socially 
responsible 
investment 




reporting devices  
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Barrier or Hazard Suppliers Structure Supplied Keys to Effectiveness 





Fines, sanctions, exclusion 
from club (remove 
participant from 
membership in label 
scheme) 
 
Education and soft or 
reflexive enforcement 
 
Checks on conflicts of 
interest: independent 
monitors separate 










Incentives to cheat Land 
conservancies 
Expands number of 
parties available to 
enforce bar on 
development of private 
lands 
 
Court system to 
enforce contracts  
F.  Funding Governance, a Public Good 
Rules, and the institutions developed to enforce them, are public 
goods,266 and the process of developing rules and effectuating them 
can be expensive. Public goods are by definition non-rival. If public 
goods are provided to anyone, everyone can enjoy their benefit 
without diminishing others’ enjoyment of them. Public goods are also 
non-exclusive—those who pay for the goods cannot exclude others 
from their enjoyment.267 In general, not everyone will contribute to 
the creation and maintenance of public goods to the extent of their 
enjoyment of those goods because they may free-ride on the efforts of 
others. Consequently, the private market will supply less of the public 
goods than would be socially optimal. 268 
Formal governments regulating within their own jurisdictional 
boundaries have several advantages in funding, most particularly, the 
latter stages of the regulatory process: implementation, monitoring, 
and enforcement. As many have noted, formal governments have the 
authority and the power to coerce implementation and compliance 
through threat of criminal sanction or monetary fines.269 More 
importantly, governments use their taxing power to overcome the 
 
 266.  Edela Schlager, Rationality, Cooperation and Common Pool Resources, 45 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 801, 804 (2002). 
 267.  See GRUBER, supra note 163, at 170. 
 268.  Id. at 176–77. 
 269.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 153; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 57; Cashore et al., supra 
note 17, at 284. 
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free-rider problem and cover the costs of developing, effectuating, 
and enforcing new rules. Unlike governmental regulation, private 
governance institutions may not rely on state authority to cover the 
costs of the implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and conflict 
resolution processes.270 In addition, they must overcome free-rider 
problems.271 
This has important consequences for institutional stability. In a 
representative democracy, the tensions between interest groups tend 
to occur primarily in the initial stages of the regulatory process: when 
the agenda is set, when the standards are negotiated, and when the 
programs are funded through the budgetary process. Firms must bear 
the costs of implementing the regulation or suffer government 
sanctions. The state bears the costs of monitoring, enforcement, and 
dispute resolution through the courts and the state funds those 
activities through tax revenues. In contrast, in private governance 
institutions, participants must find resources to cover costs at each of 
the regulatory stages; consequently, internal tensions among 
participating interest groups may continue to occur throughout the 
regulatory process. 
To develop private governance institutions, most of the 
participants must accept the rules at each stage; otherwise, they may 
opt out. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, no institution 
develops and no regulation occurs.272 If parties reach an initial 
agreement but lack sufficient means or incentives to implement that 
agreement, the policy will not be implemented.273 Incentives to cheat 
remain unchecked if there are no monitoring or enforcement 
mechanisms.274 If monitoring and enforcement are not performed in a 
 
 270.  UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 262–63 (describing 
the importance of fair allocation of the cost and benefits of a regime to the regime’s long term 
institutional stability). 
 271.  Young, Governance for the Environment, supra note 56, at 16 (“The ‘free-rider’ 
problem . . . occurs in situations where the social benefits accruing from a public good exceed 
the cost of supply, but individual members of the group would prefer to enjoy the good without 
shouldering a share of the cost.”). 
 272.  Id. at 21 (outlining the challenges of governance, including ignorance, high transaction 
cost, and massive free-rider problems, that impede resolution of socio-environmental 
problems). 
 273.  Id. at 36 (“Bargaining processes can make governance systems incoherent, and 
problems of implementation can turn them into dead letters.”). 
 274.  UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 265–67 (describing 
the importance of monitoring and enforcement); Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes 
and Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 229, 260–62 (Benjamin J. 
Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006). 
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fair manner and there are no systems to permit participants to appeal 
decisions or resolve disputes, participants may refuse to comply with 
the rules.275 The participants in private governance institutions must 
find resources to fund or otherwise support each stage of the 
regulatory process themselves. Furthermore, the way the costs of 
these burdens are allocated among the participants can have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the regulation.276 
In smaller self-governing communities, Elinor Ostrom has 
observed that the costs and benefits associated with successful 
regulatory regimes tend to be proportionate for the participants.277 If 
participants’ costs bear no relation to their benefits, they may either 
opt out or cheat, causing the system to unravel.278 The same dynamic 
is observed at the international level. States must come to an 
agreement that is collectively acceptable; there is no coercive power 
to ensure compliance.279 To the extent that certain states 
disproportionately bear the burdens from change and others reap the 
benefits, a mechanism is required to permit costs to be shared or the 
agreement will be unstable.280 
Sources of financial support may also shape the behavior of 
private governance institutions.281 Institutions that are funded by 
membership dues may be more likely to take actions that align with 
member interests and the public interest than those that receive funds 
 
 275.  UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 267–68 (describing 
the importance of dispute resolution mechanisms to the regime’s long term institutional 
stability). 
 276.  See id. at 262; GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 90, at 92 (explaining that in 
robust institutions, there is congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions). 
 277.  UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, supra note 54, at 262–63. 
 278.  Id. at 263. 
 279.  See generally Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction to LOCAL COMMONS 
AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). 
 280.  Note that this phenomenon has been observed in the common pool resource context 
and is the basis in part for caution against using any particular governing approach as a panacea. 
Following recognition of the extent to which the earth’s ecosystems were subject to a tragedy of 
the commons problem, many governments began to privatize forests and other natural 
resources, following the approach suggested by Garrett Hardin. Because many governments 
failed to allocate adequate resources to monitoring and enforcing restrictions on harvesting, the 
rate at which harvesting occurred accelerated, exacerbating the problem. In contrast, forests 
governed by local communities that assigned monitoring duties to individuals that would benefit 
directly from enforcement of the harvesting limits, fared well. See GOVERNING THE COMMONS, 
supra note 90, at 23. 
 281.  Lyon, supra note 21, at 2. 
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primarily from foundations or private industry.282 On the other hand, 
scholars have noted that while civic institutions are effective in 
pointing out failures, they may be limited in what they can achieve 
without the aid of regulatory institutions.283 The activities that 
membership organizations pursue may also reflect the limitations of 
member involvement.284 Membership-based organizations rely 
primarily on annual membership fees to cover the costs of their 
activities. They therefore have incentives to focus on activities in 
which they may garner media attention and attract new members.285 
Media-worthy activities, such as exposing harmful practices, 
identifying bad actors, and initiating educational campaigns, tend to 
occur at the beginning of the regulatory process when the regulatory 
agenda is set, and at the end of the process, when the rules must be 
enforced.286 Members may find it more difficult to engage during rule 
negotiations when the standards are set and statutory language is 
drafted, particularly if technical expertise is required.287 Public 
 
 282.  Robert J. Brulle & J. Craig Jenkins, Civil Society and the Environment: Understanding 
the Dynamics and Impacts of the U.S. Environmental Movement, in GOOD COP, BAD COP: 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS AND THEIR STRATEGIES TOWARD BUSINESS 73, 77, 92 (Thomas P. 
Lyon ed., 2010) (describing the discussion in the literature of impacts of foundation funding as 
shifting environmental nonprofits away from protest and grassroots mobilization and toward 
professionalized, centralized, nondemocratic structures with more moderate agendas); Lyon, 
supra note 21, at 5 (“Indeed, critics charge that instead of being governed by citizens, the 
environmental movement has become increasingly controlled by foundations that represent 
large corporate wealth and rationalized power in the American political economy. This, they 
say, blunts the potential impact of the movement, promotes nonparticipatory civic 
organizations, and limits the range of viewpoints represented in the public arena.”). 
 283.  See Vogel, supra note 31, at 153, 165–66, 181–84. For example, the Rainforest Action 
Network is a well-known example of a civic organization that engages in grassroots activism and 
direct action focused on well-recognized leaders in industry and commerce to achieve its goals 
to protect rainforests and to defend the rights of rainforest inhabitants. Krill, supra note 60, at 
208, 210. Factors that NGOs examine in determining which businesses they will target include 
the market share of the corporation, its reputation, and the distance that activists must travel to 
reach the corporation’s headquarters. Vogel, supra note 34, at 268. The organization derives its 
$4 million budget equally from membership dues, major donations, and foundation support—a 
proportion the organization tries to maintain. Krill, supra note 60, at 213. The organization has 
approximately 13,000 members, 100,000 online supporters, and 1000 activists that participate 
regularly. Id. The organization engages in street protests, initiates advertising campaigns, 
develops shareholder resolutions, negotiates directly with corporate boards, and generally tries 
to coordinate with other organizations that work on the same or similar issues to attack the 
concern from a different angle. Id. at 213, 217. 
 284.  See Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 960. 
 285.  Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 29. 
 286.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 63–64. 
 287.  Id. at 67–69. To the extent that the standards setting process is technical, the nuances 
may be difficult to explain, complicating any advocacy role that members may play. See id. 
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participation in the implementation and monitoring stages may also 
be challenging given firm interests in protecting trade secrets and in 
maintaining operational efficiency and security.288 For this reason, 
membership organizations that rely on the financial support of 
members and grassroots fundraising events may tend to focus on 
media-intensive activities that raise awareness and shift public 
debate289—activities that support the agenda-setting and enforcement 
stages of regulation. 
In contrast, organizations funded by private foundations and 
corporate entities often undertake projects that more strongly 
resemble traditional government activities, such as including the 
monitoring and regulation of firm behavior and the truthfulness of 
firm claims, and funding and developing public goods, such as 
conservation of endangered habitat.290 They may also undertake 
market-enhancing activities, such as the creation of exchanges to 
facilitate the trade of environmental goods, or the development of 
new markets and branding systems to direct public attention to 
alternative goods that meet consumer social and environmental 
preferences.291 The kinds of projects that these institutions undertake 
may simply reflect the availability of stable sources of funding. Long-
term, ambitious projects are less interesting in terms of 
confrontational activity and media interest, but may be more effective 
in addressing the social and environmental problems. On the other 
hand, these projects give rise to fewer conflicts with corporate 
interests, raising questions about whether firm interests are steering 
 
 288.  Because implementation, monitoring, and enforcement may occur where the public 
lacks the access (because firm security bars access), geographic location, or technical skills to 
assist in any meaningful way, members are unlikely to be able to play any direct role. 
Consequently, they may not be as ready to provide funding to support endeavors when they 
cannot participate or see the impacts directly. 
 289.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 169; see also Mattli & Woods, supra note 3, at 29 (“[T]here are 
strong incentives for NGOs to focus their attention on the first phase of regulation—agenda-
setting. The immediate benefits to NGOs of mobilizing campaigns are likely to be high: media 
attention brings them funding, new members, and public support. By contrast, engagement in 
the detailed elaboration of regulations or closely monitoring their enforcement is more time-
consuming, more resource-intensive, and less easily effective or noticed.”). 
 290.  Lyon, supra note 21, at 5; Vogel, supra note 31, at 154–55; Hoffman & Bertels, supra 
note 7, at 59–62 (showing the growing schism between (1) environmental organizations with 
corporate and foundation support that define themselves in conjunction with business and 
capitalist systems and take more moderate stances and enter into collaborative agreements with 
organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund and The Nature Conservancy, and (2) 
organizations that avoid such ties and define themselves in opposition to corporations and their 
activities, such as Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network). 
 291.  Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 7, at 59–62, 64. 
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NGOs’ activities through foundation-based and corporate funding.292 
Some organizations have developed structures to maintain a balance 
of funding from a variety of sources to avoid conflicts of interest that 
may arise between their mission and the interests of those that 
provide significant funding.293 
Given these tensions, private governance institutions have 
developed a number of innovative mechanisms to generate higher 
prices and other forms of funding, including some forms of corporate 
social responsibility, SRI firms, voluntary standards, certification, and 
labeling mechanisms, and producer cooperatives. Other institutions 
lower costs, such as some forms of CSR programs, environmental 
management systems, codes of conduct, and buyer cooperatives. 
Some programs play a facilitative role in increasing prices or reducing 
costs, including models and meta-standards, learning initiatives, and 
disclosure and reporting initiatives. 
For firms seeking capital, loans, supply contracts, or insurance, 
meeting the demands and addressing the concerns of counterparties 
to their contracts are simply a cost of doing business. For equity 
investors, lenders, or insurance companies, due diligence 
investigations and contract requirements reduce risk and increase 
rewards for investments made. To the extent the costs of managing 
their supply chains are not immediately expensed in the year 
incurred, supply chain anchors and retailers may pass the costs 
forward to consumers or back to suppliers.294 
To the extent that voluntary regulatory activities require 
investments to produce firm savings, firms will decide whether or not 
to make an investment based on the time frame in which they are 
able to recover the costs of their investment. Cost recovery is 
accelerated when income tax provisions permit deductions for the full 
 
 292.  Lyon, supra note 21, at 5; Hoffman & Bertels, supra note 7, at 56 (“Board interlocks 
are mechanisms for gaining access to critical resources such as information and, of particular 
importance to NGOs, funding, both because individual board members will influence their 
corporations’ giving and because the closer connections they have to others will also raise 
overall giving levels. But they also become mechanisms for influence by incorporating 
representatives from other institutions in the NGOs’ decision-making processes or advisory 
structures” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Note that some studies have shown that 
the existence of a confrontational environmental NGO to place pressure on corporate entities 
has had both a positive flanking effect (by providing a contrast) and a negative flanking effect 
(from the risk of being associated with the more radical groups and experiencing backlash). Id. 
at 63–66. 
 293.  Krill, supra note 60, at 213 (describing the funding structure of Rainforest Action 
Network and its rationale). 
 294.  The actual incidence and distribution of these costs has not yet been modeled. 
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expense of activities associated with voluntary regulatory regimes in 
the year they are incurred. When significant capital investments are 
involved, such as technological changes, firms may be required to 
capitalize the investment and recover the costs through depreciation 
deductions over time. Cost savings and capital recovery enjoyed 
immediately following implementation make investments more 
attractive. 
Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems address a 
portion of the costs of governance by charging fees to their members. 
They also market the certification and labeling program to generate 
market demand and procure a price premium for certified goods. 
Certification participants may use these premiums to cover the costs 
of participating in the certification process. SRI firms, like other 
investment firms, charge their clients fees to meet their clients’ 
preferences. 
Funding sources for many private governance institutions may 
include charitable donations from individuals, firms, and foundations 
and grants from governmental entities. Conservation land trusts 
benefit from tax exempt status as charities and may also receive 
donated property or funds to purchase property rights and manage 
them. They may also receive royalties from leases of resource 
extraction rights. Donors benefit from tax deductions that are 
available for donations or below-market sales to public charities.295 
Table 6 below identifies the main sources of funding for the 
various types of private governance institutions. 
 
Table 6. Funding Sources and Economic Incentives  
 
Institution Funding Sources 
Firm Programs Green and social premium; savings from increase in efficiency, 
lower costs, less waste 
 





Cost savings from coordination within firm, increased compliance, 
reduced costs from monitoring 
 
 
 295.  See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006). A number of concerns have arisen about fraudulent activity 
associated with valuation of the conservation easements, the value of the properties to which 
they are subject, and the tax benefits that accrue to the individuals who participate in these 
transactions. There are also concerns about whether conservation easements will be enforced 
over time. See generally Bray, supra note 241. 
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Institution Funding Sources 
Acquisition and 
Investment Contracts 
Reduced risk of loss and shifting of risk of loss following due 
diligence investigations through contractual arrangements 
 
Lending Contracts Reduced risk of loss and shifting of risk of loss following due 
diligence investigations through contractual arrangements 
 
Supply Chain Contracts  Green and social premium; reduced risk of loss from unstable 
supply, contract claims, tort liability 
 
Insurance Contracts Reduced risk of loss and shifting of risk of loss following 
underwriting investigations through exclusions from coverage 
 
Cooperatives Reduction of risk of loss from information asymmetries and 
moral hazard; increased profits from increased bargaining power 





Private donations, foundation funding, grants 
Learning Initiatives Private donations, foundation funding, grants, fees for services 
 





Private donations, foundation funding, grants, fees for services 
 






Land Conservancies Private donations; foundation funding; sales, rents, royalties from 
lands; tax incentives to donors; tax exempt status of nonprofit and 




Price premium for certified goods; membership fees; foundation 
funding; private donors 
 
 
As noted above in part I, supra, each type of private governance 
system has something to contribute to the regulatory process. Table 6 
identifies each stage of regulation and the types of private governance 
institutions that bring resources to bear at each stage. Not every 
institution has all of the structures needed to produce regulation that 
is in the public interest at every stage. In fact, as Table 7 shows, only 
voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems and 
cooperatives attempt to address governance needs at every stage of 
the regulatory process. 
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X    X 
Supply Chain Contracts  X     X 
Insurance Contracts X   (X)  X 
Firm CSR Programs  X X (X) (X) 
Socially Responsible 
Investment 
 X  (X) X 
Codes of Conduct  X X   
Environmental 
Management Systems 
  X (X)  
Learning Initiatives   X   
Reporting Initiatives     (X) X 
Models and Meta-
Standards 
 (X) X   
Acquisition and 
Investment Contracts 
   (X) X 
Lending Contracts    (X) X 
Audits     X  
Voluntary standards, 
certification, and labeling 
systems 
X X X X X 
Cooperatives X* X* X* X* X* 
 
X = Provides   (X) = Varies   X*= Stage internalized 
 
However, private governance institutions frequently operate as 
part of a network or an ensemble regime.296 Consequently, they may 
complement one another and, potentially, produce synergistic 
effects.297 
For example, one possible sequence may proceed as follows. At 
the agenda-setting stage, NGOs educate consumers about lead 
contamination in toys sold by a leading retailer. At the negotiation of 
standards stage, the retailer, under threat of tort litigation, sets 
substantive requirements for its suppliers to exclude lead and similar 
substances in the manufacturing of products. To implement the 
retailer standards, suppliers employ management systems designed to 
 
 296.  See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9; Oren Perez, Private Environmental 
Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and the 
New Ensemble Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 543 (2011). 
 297.  See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9. 
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avoid the use of lead and similar substances in the manufacture and 
assembly of the products and require their secondary suppliers to 
exclude those substances in the manufacture of component parts. To 
monitor and enforce the contract, the retailer includes provisions for 
periodic inspections and hires an auditing firm to verify that its 
requirements are being met. Based on the audits, the retailer 
sanctions suppliers that fail to adhere to its standards through 
contract or by withholding repeat business. The retailer funds the 
process by increased consumer prices, but the price increase may be 
justified as a premium for safety assurances.298 
In fact, this shift to decentralized, multi-modal, networked forms 
of governance may be necessary to address the kinds of complex 
environmental problems that have resisted solution by centralized 
governmental regulation.299 Private governance may provide 
 
 298.  Another possible sequence may involve additional participants. NGOs increase 
awareness about sweatshop labor conditions in apparel manufacturers in Southeast Asia and 
identify particular companies that employ child laborers and have poor safety records. They 
may also engage in name and shame campaigns and institute boycotts of the products of the 
specific companies identified. SRI firms screen those manufacturers from their list of 
investments and sell stock from those companies. To rehabilitate its reputation and restore its 
market share, the company becomes a member of a learning initiative and employs a 
management system. By implementing new management processes, the company improves 
conditions. The company employs a third-party audit to confirm to the learning initiative and 
the reporting initiative that it has made improvements. The reporting initiative in turn provides 
information about these changes to investors, retail chain suppliers, and the general public. The 
company covers the costs associated with engagement of the learning initiative and the 
reporting initiative and employing the environmental management system, but passes the costs 
forward in the price of its apparel and gains market share from an improved reputation. SRI 
firms again include the stock of the company in their portfolios and consumers again purchase 
the goods following confirmation that the firm’s labor practices have improved and are being 
monitored. 
 299.  See Craig Anthony Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and 
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771 (2011) (arguing that both 
monolithic and fragmented approaches to environmental problems are proving inadequate, that 
environmental law is evolving toward use of multiple methods to manage complex 
environmental problems, and that those methods require some level of coordination for success 
in addressing the complexities of social ecological systems); J.B. Ruhl & James E. Salzman, 
Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for 
Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2010) (describing problems resistant to any one policy 
response, such as problems that aggregate proportionally, problems in which responses to one 
source can exacerbate another source, problems with feedback loops in which policy responses 
may have extensive spill-over hazards, and problems with significant discontinuities in which the 
impacts are felt far from the source of the problem or at some point in the distant future). 
Similarly, Elinor Ostrom, writing in the political science literature, suggests that there are no 
panaceas in addressing complex social ecological systems, and offers an expanded version of her 
IAD framework to analyze the rules, institutions, networks, and nested enterprises developed to 
manage these systems. See Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 
104 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 15,181 (2007). 
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additional, independent cuts at problems that may not otherwise be 
amenable to “whittling away” by formal government responses.300 
Furthermore, concerns associated with the theory of the firm may 
determine whether an organization performs all aspects of the 
regulatory process or relies on other institutions to perform them.301 
Note, however, that a number of voluntary standards, certification, 
and labeling systems have identified credibility costs associated with 
having the monitoring functions housed within the same entity that 
performs standards-setting and implementation functions.302  
III.  CONFLICT AND COMPETITION AMONG PRIVATE GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS 
While combinations of private governance institutions may 
collaborate to produce effective regulation, private governance 
systems also conflict with formal government and with one another. 
First, they may compete for regulatory space and support.303 Trade 
association codes of conduct304 and CSR efforts305 may disarm 
education and mobilization initiatives that are making a case for 
 
 300.  Cf. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 299, at 120 (concluding that a single government 
agency is often incapable of combatting complex problems caused by multiple actors). 
 301.  See Klein, supra note 225. Under a transaction-cost analysis, whether a firm performs 
functions itself or outsources those functions may depend on whether the internal costs of 
information flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance evaluation of employees outweigh, 
at the margin, the external transaction costs associated with relying on other entities to perform 
parts of the regulatory process. In addition, private governance institutions are often developed 
to address government failures. To the extent that the courts are not functioning as the source 
of enforcement of contracts, private governance institutions may chose instead to internalize 
these activities. 
 302.  See Courville, supra note 61, at 283, 287–88. 
 303.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 78–79. 
 304.  Auld et al., supra note 9, at 423. Trade associations have often developed codes of 
conduct in the wake of an industry disaster, with the goal of deterring government regulation. 
Id. For example, following the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, the chemical industry was 
successful in deflecting the threat of regulation by developing a code of conduct called the 
Responsible Care Program. Id. Subsequent studies have shown that Responsible Care 
participants showed worse environmental performance than firms that did not join program. See 
id; Vogel, supra note 31, at 167–68 (providing as examples the pharmaceutical industry’s 
adoption of the International Code of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices to ward off threat of 
regulation by the World Health Organization, and the International Chamber of Commerce’s 
development of a Business Charter for Sustainable Development to forestall environmental 
regulation following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit). 
 305.  See Vogel, supra note 31, at 167–68 (describing how in 1992, following the Rio Summit, 
the Chamber of Commerce developed a Business Charter for Sustainable Development to 
deflect possible global environmental regulation). 
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regulation and preempt other public or private regulatory activity.306 
They may undermine coalitions by splitting them into factions 
supporting greater or lesser regulatory stringencies.307 They may also 
divert the attention away from firms that would otherwise be targets 
for activism and toward programs that would not otherwise be 
primary targets.308 
Second, private governance regimes are sometimes used in an 
anti-competitive manner against other firms within a common 
industry. Anchor firm requirements that their supply chains 
implement environmental controls may have significant anti-
competitive impacts. By requiring their supply chain contractors to 
invest in expensive technology, anchor firms may spread the costs of 
their own regulatory compliance. When a firm requires its supplier to 
make a regulatory change, the supplier may raise the price of its 
goods for all of its customers to cover the costs associated with 
change; thus, a portion of the financial burden of change shifts to the 
firm’s competitors.309 When the competitors are sensitive to price 
changes on their inputs, the increase in price may drive them out of 
business,310 revealing a potential anti-competitive motive behind the 
requirement. Firms promoting codes of conduct within their 
industries may also have an anti-competitive motive in promulgating 
new rules and requirements for their competitors. If they have lower 
costs of compliance compared to their competitors, the new rules will 
put them at an advantage. 
While competition for regime participants has at times caused 
private governance institutions to ratchet up their standards311 and 
 
 306.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 75. 
 307.  Id. at 76. 
 308.  Id. This data may indicate that codes of conduct only shield industry from regulation, 
and are ineffective in improving environmental performance because of weak standards and 
significant free-riding. However, some scholars have suggested that the comparatively poor 
performance of members of the Responsible Care Program could be the result of a shift in the 
focus of education and mobilization initiatives away from Responsible Care participants and 
toward other firms that did not sign up for the program. See Lyon, supra note 3, at 59. 
 309.  Vandenbergh, supra note 89, at 950. 
 310.  See id. 
 311.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 78 (“Implicit bargaining takes the form of 
competition among parallel schemes to control the regulatory space. In some cases, competition 
exerts pressure toward higher standards.”). See also Auld et al., supra note 17, at 192 (explaining 
how “comparative reports in the United States [between the standards of Forest Stewardship 
Council and the Sustainable Forestry Initiative] were used to pressure the SFI to continually 
change, narrowing the gap between its approach and that of the FSC”). 
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implement more democratic structures and procedures,312 more 
frequently it has forced civic institutions to water down their 
standards.313 SRI programs compete for investors,314 while labeling 
systems compete for both consumers and participants.315 Institutions 
with lower minimum standards attract more participants because, in 
general, the participants have to incur fewer costs to participate. 
Higher standards may be more attractive to consumers to the extent 
that they more closely align with consumer preferences for risk. 
Trade associations have often used the second mover 
advantage316 to develop alternate schemes that resemble stringent 
 
 312.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 78 (“Industry schemes . . . which may have been 
created with the aim of preemption but must compete with NGO and multi-stakeholder 
schemes for legitimacy and public support—have over time strengthened their substantive 
standards, procedures . . . and governance (e.g., adding stakeholder advisory or supervisory 
boards).”). 
 313.  For instance, the Forest Stewardship Council, an organization developed with input 
from business, government, and environmental organizations, has created a certification and 
labeling system for forest management and forest products to encourage sustainable harvesting. 
The organization has been criticized as having allowed its standards to be compromised in order 
to increase the participation by large retail firms in the United States and the European Union. 
 314.  For examples of eco-friendly investments attempting to attract participants, see 
Sustainable & Responsible Investing, CALVERT INVESTMENTS, http://www.calvert.com/sri.html 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011); DOMINI SOCIAL INVESTMENTS, http://www.domini.com (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2011); About Us, ACUMEN FUND, http://www.acumenfund.org/about-us.html (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2011). 
 315.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 76 (“In a variety of sectors, once an NGO-based or 
collaborative scheme has been created and begins to press firms to sign on, the relevant industry 
association creates a competing, business-friendly scheme. Examples include SFI and PEFC, 
forest industry schemes created in response to the FSC, and WRAP, an apparel industry labor 
rights scheme created in response to the FLA.”). The Fair Labor Association (FLA) was 
developed in the late 1990s as the monitoring and certification branch of the Apparel Industry 
Partnership formed to address sweatshop labor practices by the Clinton administration, the 
Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees, NGOs such as the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights and International Labor Rights Fund, and apparel 
manufacturers. Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States, Social Movements, and the 
Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433, 449–
50 (2003). FLA certifies apparel industry supply chains. Errol Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia: 
Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems 18 (2006) (Buffalo 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-019), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=917952. In contrast, Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) was 
founded by the apparel industry and certifies individual factories. Id. “The competition among 
the programs has been intense and contentious at times.” Id. 
 316.  While “first movers” face high costs associated with research, development, 
implementation, and educating the public to develop a market for their goods, second movers 
may take advantage of what the first movers have done. Second movers face lower costs 
because they may use the first mover as a model, learning from first mover successes and 
failures, and enjoying the market that the first mover developed. See Michael Abramowicz & 
John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340 
(2008) (describing the two advantages that late entrants have over early market experimenters 
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systems developed by civic institutions in structure, but contain only 
minimal requirements for compliance.317 Asymmetric information 
creates an opportunity for opportunistic behavior.318 Weak labels may 
attempt to free-ride on the goodwill associated with strong labels and 
capture a portion of the premiums generated through labeling green 
or socially responsible goods.319 When a number of labels emerge in 
rapid succession, noise may overwhelm the signal that a labeling 
system sends.320 
Multiple schemes in any sector may result in investor and 
consumer confusion.321 When multiple certification systems govern 
the same industry or subject matter, consumers and investors may 
become concerned about whether the certification systems continue 
to signal environmental performance. To the extent that the public 
recognizes that there may be differences between labels, consumers 
and investors may demand more information.322 Identifying, 
documenting, and segregating firms or products based on social and 
environmental criteria is expensive. Efficiency declines as consumers 
are required to spend more time and resources investigating labels. 
Even where there are no competing labels, a certification process 
may decouple from the practices and performance that the 
certification process is supposed to reflect.323 Chain of custody and 
other verification systems are also vulnerable to cheating and fraud.324 
 
as avoiding the expense of developing the market and copying the first entrant’s market 
successes and avoiding its failures). Consequently, second movers may capture greater market 
share. 
 317.  These organizations “adopt the trappings” of fair regulatory processes to develop 
guidelines without actually imposing prescriptive requirements. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, 
at 76; Auld et al., supra note 17, at 189–95 (comparing SFI to FSC). See also Auld, supra note 9, 
at 422 (describing ISO 14000, an NGO-developed model environmental management system, 
which certifies firms that develop internal management processes but does not require that the 
systems contain prescriptive standards or impose any benchmarks or requirements). 
 318.  See King et al., supra note 142, at 1092. 
 319.  Wood, supra note 274, at 259. 
 320.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 79–80. 
 321.  There is some suggestion that this may be a form of intentional interplay. Creating a 
similar label allows a firm to free-ride on the goodwill and value associated with existing labels. 
This may substantiate the move by the Federal Trade Commission in 1992 to regulate green 
claims. See Michelle Diffenderfer & Keri-Ann C. Baker, Greenwashing: What Your Client 
Should Know to Avoid Costly Litigation and Consumer Backlash, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 21 (2011). 
 322.  Darby & Karni, supra note 87, at 84. 
 323.  King et al., supra note 142, at 1094. 
 324.  Id. at 1094 (“The third-party audits required by certified management standards 
reduce the risk of decoupling, but as demonstrated by recent scandals in cost accounting, third-
party certification does not guarantee honesty, nor does it prevent changes in practices after 
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This may cast doubt not only on the particular system in question, but 
also on the integrity of all certification processes. 
Consequently, demand has grown for increased transparency and 
a means to evaluate the various certification and labeling programs.325 
Again, private governance institutions have arisen to meet this 
demand. Some nonprofit organizations have begun to address label 
confusion by compiling lists of all known eco-labels and evaluating 
those institutions based on self-reported information from the 
organizations developing the labels.326 Consumers have also 
developed websites and blogs to expose false claims.327 In addition, 
private firms have also begun to respond to demand for information 
about social and environmental claims to prevent clients from losing 
market share from greenwashing and to keep competitors from free-
riding on their development of markets for socially responsible and 
sustainable sourcing.328 
Finally, in some cases, the federal government has intervened to 
protect consumer expectations and control labeling and advertising 
claims. The Federal Trade Commission Act authorized the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) to take direct action against the firms that 
 
certification. If decoupling becomes too frequent, certification will no longer provide real 
information for differentiating underlying organizational attributes . . . .”). 
 325.  See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/ (last visited Oct. 
5, 2011) (providing a database that lists and describes various ecolabels, with the aim of 
“increasing transparency and helping buyers and sellers use [ecolabels] more effectively”). As 
with all verification processes, the effectiveness of this endeavor is limited by the truthfulness of 
the organizations’ responses, whether the organizations are subject to having their submissions 
verified, and of course, the pertinence and clarity of the questions to which the organizations are 
asked to respond. Bibi van der Zee, Listing the Green Labels, GUARDIAN GREEN LIVING BLOG 
(Jan. 31, 2008, 5:22 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ethicallivingblog/2008/ 
jan/31/labelgeeks (describing how the ecolabel index helps consumers understand otherwise 
“incomprehensible” ecolabels). 
 326.  See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, supra note 325. 
 327.  Diffenderfer & Baker, supra note 321, at 21, 25; see also Lane, supra note 8, at 747–48. 
 328.  TerraChoice Group, Inc., an environmental marketing firm, has begun to issue annual 
reports examining firm environmental and social claims, identifying seven “sins” of 
greenwashing: lack of proof, vagueness, irrelevance (advertising absence of substances already 
banned by law), hidden trade-offs, creating false impressions of third-party endorsements, 
distracting the consumer from broader impacts, and lying. See The Seven Sins, TERRACHOICE: 
SINS OF GREENWASHING, http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/the-seven-sins/ (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2011). EnviroMedia Social Marketing, Inc., a public relations and advertising firm, has in 
conjunction with the University of Oregon developed a website that allows consumers to post 
copies of advertisements that contain environmental and social claims and to rate the ads based 
on whether the ads mislead with words, visual, or graphic information, make claims that are 
vague or impossible to prove, overstate or exaggerate, or omit or mask key information. See 
About Greenwashing, GREENWASHING INDEX, http://www.greenwashingindex.com/criteria.php 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
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make unfair or deceptive advertising claims.329 Following consumer 
complaints about greenwashing, the FTC developed Guides for the 
Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides”) in 1992.330 
The FTC has since revised the guides twice and a new version is due 
to be released this year.331 The Green Guides provide firms with a safe 
harbor against claims for unfair or deceptive advertising under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act,332 so long as the firms making 
environmental claims are specific and provide substantiation of those 
claims.333 
CONCLUSION 
The process of sorting private governance institutions by their 
function in addressing regulatory needs and meeting the challenges of 
government failure at each stage of the regulatory process has yielded 
a number of insights about what kinds of structures make private 
governance institutions effective and ways that networked institutions 
may work together to form a regulatory regime that is in the public 
interest. 
First, it is not necessary for a single private governance 
institution to meet the governance demands of all stages of the 
regulatory process for private governance to be effective. Private 
governance institutions may work together through collaboration, 
cooperation, and contractual arrangements with other institutions and 
with formal government to achieve effective regulation through a 
networked or ensemble regime. There are, however, certain design 
features that strengthen regulatory regimes at the various stages. 
Supplemental structures, collaboration with other institutions, or 
specific forms of support from formal government may address 
weaknesses in existing regimes.  
At the agenda-setting stage, private governance institutions that 
are independent of their regulatory targets can bring public 
awareness to social costs associated with firm activities and credibly 
identify the causes of social harm. If they are representative of 
 
 329.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006) (authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate 
unfair trade practices or unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce, to hold 
hearings and issue cease and desist orders, and to commence civil actions to recover civil 
penalties and equitable relief against parties that fail to comply with the orders.) 
 330.  16 C.F.R. §§ 260.1– 260.8 (2012). 
 331.  Diffenderfer & Baker, supra note 321, at 21. 
 332.  Id. at 22. 
 333.  See 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (2012). 
Roberts_FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/5/2012  6:03 PM 
Fall 2011] PRIVATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS 141 
community interests and are not dominated by any one funding 
source, they may be able to garner sufficient public support to induce 
public officials to regulate or generate interest in private governance 
if the hazards and barriers to legislation appear to be too high. Trade 
association and industry codes of conduct have been allowed to 
crowd-out both public regulation and private governance institutions 
that are more representative of the public interest. While 
organizational structure may provide some insight about control and 
the capacity of the organization to regulate in the public interest, 
inquiry into the major funding sources for a proposed self-regulatory 
regime would be more revealing. Before governments waive their 
responsibility to regulate and before education and mobilization 
initiatives and other private governance institutions cede the field to 
institutions whose primary function is to lower the barriers to self-
regulation within the targeted industry or to avoid formal regulation, 
they and the media should focus on the institutions’ funding sources. 
When standards are negotiated, private governance institutions 
that supply structures that make the regulatory process transparent, 
open, and inclusive are more effective in avoiding capture and 
developing regulation in the public interest. By including structures 
that foster broad public participation, transparency, and deliberative 
processes that give stakeholders the ability to contribute in a 
meaningful way, they allow constituents to overcome the regulatory 
capture that increasingly clouds the process in a representative 
democracy. As the number of parties involved at each stage of the 
regulatory process expands, the expense of influence increases, and 
capture becomes more difficult. Structures that provide for consensus 
decision-making, or include tripartite structures that limit the power 
of any one interest group to dominate, are more successful at 
producing regulation in the public interest. 
At the implementation stage, the primary obstacle to adoption of 
the standards is the cost associated with change. Private governance 
institutions can offer firms flexibility, lower the cost associated with 
implementing the new rules, and level the playing field to reduce 
market uncertainties that arise from change. Institutions that provide 
price premiums and lower costs of capital investment or accelerate 
cost recovery expedite adoption and implementation of standards. 
Formal government may support implementation by protecting these 
price premiums through regulation of false advertising claims for 
credence goods or by providing tax benefits that permit more rapid 
recovery of costs that firms incur during the implementation process. 
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At the monitoring stage, a number of institutions address the 
demands of monitoring by expanding the number of monitors. By 
disclosing information and publicizing claims made by firms about 
their activities, monitoring institutions enroll and empower activists, 
shareholders, consumers, the media, competing firms, and the general 
public to participate in the monitoring process. Unfortunately, most 
institutions that relay firm-reported information about social and 
environmental performance lack monitoring or verification systems. 
In addition, except for employees, most of the additional “monitors” 
lack opportunities to watch firm practices and expose any deviation 
from what is set forth in the reports. Consequently, if the incentive to 
cheat is not checked, these programs will not enhance efficiency. 
Instead, they will direct consumption and investment flows to firms 
that do not accurately meet consumer or investor preferences, which 
reduces social welfare. Given that they rely primarily on the self-
reported claims of industry, disclosure and reporting initiatives and 
SRI programs could benefit from a whistle-blowing platform that 
they either provide themselves or through collaboration with other 
institutions involved in improving firm performance along social and 
environmental parameters, such as learning initiatives. A whistle-
blowing platform would facilitate information sharing about 
performance, noncompliance, and errors in the firm disclosure 
reports. To the extent that private governance systems use auditing 
systems to monitor compliance, they may avoid concerns about bias 
by ensuring that auditors are financially and functionally independent 
of both the advocacy organizations that developed the standards and 
the targets being regulated. 
Separate analysis of private governance institutions from 
“hybrid” organizations that are instituted by formal government, such 
as public voluntary programs and negotiated agreements, reveals two 
key features that private governance institutions must provide to 
ensure that the institution is stable and resilient over time. First, 
dispute resolution structures support the enforcement stage. Because 
there is no threat of criminal or other sanction except those that the 
parties agree to and can impose on one another, private governance is 
always limited to a coalition of the willing. The tensions that gave rise 
to the development of a private governance institution in the first 
place continue to exist between stakeholders after the standards have 
been set and the program has been implemented. Disputes about fair 
enforcement of the rules can destabilize hard-won alliances because 
of the availability of exit.  
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Conflicts, if left untended, may devolve into cheating, opting-out, 
and institutional failure. Institutions that provide cheap, accessible 
dispute resolution mechanisms support fair enforcement of the rules 
and permit participants to resolve their conflicts quickly, thereby 
preserving alliances. Dispute resolution systems enhance the 
credibility of the institution and help to secure the long-term 
involvement of its participants. 
The second key feature is a funding structure. Tax revenues fund 
much, if not all, of the governmental regulatory process, decoupling 
the costs of regulation from the process of regulating. In contrast, 
private governance institutions must not only satisfy the demands of 
each of the five stages of regulation, but they must also fund each 
stage of regulation. Free-riding may result in both instability and the 
under-funding of public goods—the institutions necessary to monitor 
compliance and enforce the rules. Allocation of the costs of 
regulation is a sensitive matter in the context of private governance 
because if participants perceive that the benefits and burdens of 
regulation are distributed unfairly, the coalition may fail. In addition, 
the source of funding may impact the forms the regulatory structures 
take, rendering them less effective. Therefore, organizations that 
generate sufficient value to cover their costs will be much more 
resilient to the outside pressures and inside tensions that occur 
throughout the regulatory process. Systems that include a market 
element can potentially generate a premium that will cover some 
portion of the governance process. Other institutional forms, such as 
cooperatives, may reduce the need for monitoring and enforcement 
by eliminating or reducing the incentives for agents to take advantage 
of their partners. In addition, when institutional structures eliminate 
the incentives to cheat, the need for and costs of monitoring are 
reduced. 
Finally, the institutional sorting process shows that only one type 
of institution attempts to substitute for government at each stage of 
the regulatory process: voluntary standards, certification, and labeling 
systems. Voluntary standards, certification, and labeling systems 
educate the public about the impacts of their consumption decisions, 
activate consumer norms, and facilitate the internalization into the 
price of a good the costs associated with avoiding social or 
environmental harm. In addition, they address the transaction costs 
that consumers face in locating and negotiating with the “cheapest 
cost avoider” in global trade by creating structured links between 
those parties; they resolve both the information asymmetries and 
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search costs that consumers face in purchasing credence goods by 
identifying conforming goods; they use structures that invite broad 
participation and deliberation, reducing the risk of capture during the 
standards-setting process; they provide training to develop an 
expanding number of experts to assist firms in adopting and 
implementing the standards; they use consumer markets and labels to 
incentivize compliance; they generate their own financial support—an 
important factor in maintaining legitimacy and effectiveness over 
time; and finally, their certification processes ensure that participants 
adhere to those standards. These systems are therefore marked for 
more focused study, since they provide a unique solution to 
governmental void and to situations in which government exists and 
has authority to act but does not take action because of regulatory 
fragmentation or race to the bottom dynamics. 
Sorting the institutions by the roles they play in the regulatory 
process also reveals the limits of a functional typology, since some 
private governance institutions accomplish similar ends without 
creating substitute regulatory regimes. For instance, cooperatives 
address demands for governance not by mimicking the governmental 
process, but by changing incentive structures. Cooperatives resolve 
the principal–agent problem by placing the party to be protected on 
both sides of the transaction, which reduces the need for monitoring. 
They also allow competitors to collaborate to achieve economies of 
scale and to compete with larger enterprises without losing the 
competitive advantages they possess from time- and location-specific 
knowledge. And finally, they accomplish these ends not by providing 
structures that set a regulatory agenda and negotiate, implement, 
monitor, and enforce those standards, but rather, by changing the 
incentives that make standards, monitoring, and enforcement 
necessary. 
